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INTRODUCTION
In one of the most celebrated law review articles of all time, Karl
Llewellyn argued that the traditional canons of statutory construction
are not reliable guides to predicting judicial interpretations, because for
every canon supporting one interpretation there is a counter-canon cut-
ting against that interpretation.1 He accomplished his tour de force in
large part by focusing upon the "referential" canons-rules referring
the Court to an outside or preexisting source to determine statutory
meaning'-and upon the "linguistic" canons-general conventions of
language, grammar, and syntax.3 Llewellyn did not explore in any detail
the "substantive" canons, the clear statement rules or presumptions of
statutory interpretation4 that reflect substantive values drawn from the
common law, federal statutes, or the United States Constitution. Much
the same exercise could be performed in connection with the substan-
tive canons-for every canon there is a counter-canon-but with this
difference: The substantive canons do reflect some overall tendency or
slant in the Court's interpretation of statutes. That is, unlike the lin-
guistic canons or the referential canons, the substantive canons are not
1. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Ca-
nons about How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395, 401-06 (1950). Llewellyn
wrote great articles but gave them bad titles.
2. Id. at 401-04. By and large, "Thrust But Parry" numbers 2-6, 8-10, and 13-14 involve
referential canons. Compare, for example, Thrust #5, "Where various states have already adopted
the statute, the parent state is followed," with Parry #5, "Where interpretations of other states are
inharmonious, there is no such restraint."
3. Id. at 403-06. By and large, "Thrust But Parry" Numbers 11-12 and 15-28 involve linguis-
tic canons. Compare, for example, Thrust #20, "Expression of one thing excludes another," with
Parry #20, "The language may fairly comprehend many different cases where some only are ex-
pressly mentioned by way of exam ple."
4. We shall use three different terms throughout this Article for canons of statutory con-
struction. "Presumptions" of interpretation are general policies the Court will "presume" Congress
intends to incorporate into statutes. Presumptions can be rebutted by persuasive arguments that
the statutory text, legislative history, or purpose is inconsistent with the presumptions. "Clear
statement rules" require a "clear statement" on the face of the statute to rebut a policy presump-
tion the Court has created. These two terms-presumption and clear statement rule-are con-
trasted in Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 111 S. Ct. 2166, 2169-71 (1991), and EEOC
v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1237-38 (1991) (Marshall dissenting). To this tradi-
tional contrast, this Article adds a third term, "super-strong clear statement rules," that seem to
require very specifically targeted "clear statements" on the face of the statute to rebut a policy
presumption the Court has created. For examples of such super-strong clear statement rules in the
1990 Term alone, see Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991); Blatchford v. Native Village of
Noatak & Circle Village, 111 S. Ct. 2578 (1991); Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). See also
United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 60 U.S.L.W. 4159 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1992) (creating a new super-
strong clear statement rule against waivers of federal sovereign immunity).
5. For recent scholarship focusing on these substantive canons and influencing this Article,
see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1007
(1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 405
(1989).
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policy neutral. They represent value choices by the Court.
A modern Karl Llewellyn might quarrel that, if the substantive ca-
nons are malleable (just as the linguistic and referential canons are),
how can they be said to have any systematic effect on the Court's re-
sults in statutory cases? We agree that the malleability of the canons
prevents them from constraining the Court or forcing certain results in
statutory interpretation through deductive reasoning from first canoni-
cal principles. Yet we also think that the substantive canons are con-
nected in an important way with the results the Court reaches in
statutory cases, though not in the cause-effect (canons produce results)
way traditionally assumed and effectively criticized by Llewellyn.
Rather the opposite occurs: The canons are one means by which the
Court expresses the value choices that it is making or strategies it is
taking when it interprets statutes (thus, results produce canons). The
canons are constructed, and reconstructed, over time. The precise way
in which a Court deploys substantive canons of statutory construction
reflects an underlying "ideology," or mix of values and strategies that
the Court brings to statutory interpretation.
Our hypothesis is testable. If it is true, different Courts will express
their different ideologies by emphasizing, or even creating, different
substantive canons in the complex work of statutory interpretation. In
Parts I and II of this Article, we test the hypothesis by comparing the
Supreme Court's use of constitutionally based canons during the middle
Burger Court (roughly, the 1975 through 1980 Terms) with its use of
such canons during the late Burger Court (1981 through 1985 Terms)
and the emerging Rehnquist Court (1986 Term onward). We believe
that this comparison across a limited time period yields striking differ-
ences both in the canons the Court invokes and in the way in which the
canons are invoked. Several conclusions emerge from our comparison.
One theme is that as the Supreme Court grew less activist in con-
stitutional interpretation during the 1980s,6 it grew correspondingly
more activist in statutory interpretation. That is, the Court in the 1980s
became somewhat more reluctant to apply constitutional rules to pro-
hibit state and federal legislative action, but somewhat more stingy
6. As the decade progressed, the Court seemed increasingly reluctant to strike down federal
and state statutes on constitutional grounds. Recently, the Court has upheld controversial regula-
tions or statutes delegating criminal sentencing rulemaking to a largely judicial body, see Mistretta
v. United States, 408 U.S. 361 (1989); restricting the rights of federally assisted medical programs
to advise women of abortion options and the rights of women to obtain abortions upon demand,
see Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991); vesting certain prosecutions in officials outside the
control of the executive branch, see Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); regulating nude (but
not legally obscene) dancing, see Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991), and so forth.
Even in the arenas of affirmative action and taking of private property, where the current Court
seems poised to greater activism, the Court's actual decisions to date are fairly restrained.
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about interpreting federal statutes, often basing its analysis upon con-
stitutional concerns. Like the Court in the 1970s, the current Court ex-
presses its constitutional concerns through "presumptions" that can be
rebutted by statutory language, legislative history, and overall purpose,
as well as through "clear statement rules" that can only be rebutted by
clear statutory text.
A further theme of this study is that the current Court emphasizes
a different array of clear statement rules than did the Court in the
1970s. The current Court is less inclined to protect individual rights
through cautious statutory interpretation than the Court was a decade
ago, and more inclined to protect constitutional structures through cau-
tious interpretation. Moreover, consistent with its interest in textualism
as its dominant interpretive methodology, the current Court emphasizes
clear statement rules much more than presumptions. Indeed, the most
striking innovation of the recent Court has been its creation of a series
of new "super-strong clear statement rules" protecting constitutional
structures, especially structures associated with federalism.
These super-strong clear statement rules are remarkable. On the
one hand, they require a clearer, more explicit statement from Congress
in the text of the statute, without reference to legislative history, than
prior clear statement rules have required. This would suggest that such
rules are protecting particularly important constitutional values. But,
on the other hand, the super-strong clear statement rules the Court has
actually adopted protect constitutional values that are virtually never
enforced through constitutional interpretation. That is, the Court in the
1980s has tended to create the strongest clear statement rules to confine
Congress's power in areas in which Congress has the constitutional
power to do virtually anything. What the Court is doing is creating a
domain of "quasi-constitutional law" in certain areas: Judicial review
does not prevent Congress from legislating, but judicial interpretation
of the resulting legislation requires an extraordinarily specific statement
on the face of the statute for Congress to limit the states or the execu-
tive department.
That the Court's super-strong clear statement rules are new does
not mean they are undesirable, of course. In fact, a good case can be
made for such quasi-constitutional law: structural constitutional protec-
tions, especially those of federalism, are underenforced constitutional
norms. They are essentially unenforceable by the Court as a direct limi-
tation upon Congress's power, and are best left to the political process.
But the Court may have a legitimate role in forcing the political process
to pay attention to the constitutional values at stake, and super-strong
clear statement rules are a practical way for the Court to focus legisla-
tive attention on these values.
1992]
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Notwithstanding this argument, Part III raises normative concerns
with these rules. Our main concern is that the reasons the Court and
commentators have given for leaving federalism and other structural
values underenforced also argue against the Court's new super-strong
clear statement rules, which are almost as countermajoritarian as now
discredited Lochner-style judicial review. In this respect, the Court's
new canons amount to a "backdoor" version of the constitutional activ-
ism that most Justices on the current Court have publicly denounced.
Further, the values protected by this backdoor constitutional lawmak-
ing-presidential preferences over congressional preferences as a source
of law, state sovereignty over national regulation, and established inter-
ests over interests of the politically marginalized-strike us as constitu-
tionally unworthy.
I. CONSTITUTIONALLY BASED PRESUMPTIONS AND CLEAR STATEMENT
RULES: THE CATALOGUE, CIRCA 1981
A good many of the substantive canons of statutory construction
are directly inspired by the Constitution, as we shall explain in this
Part. Although most of the constitutionally based canons have weighty
precedential pedigrees, their importance and the way they are deployed
change over time and reflect an underlying ideology, which includes the
Court's view of what is an important constitutional value, the relative
importance of different constitutional values, and strategies for imple-
menting those values.
The period of the middle Burger Court (1975 through 1980 Terms)
was one of moderate judicial activism in both constitutional and statu-
tory interpretation. It was a rather curious activism, though, because
the Burger Court's underlying ideology was strongly pluralist and
proceduralist. It was pluralist insofar as it protected constitutional val-
ues that were generally acceptable to the dominant interest group coali-
tion in America in the late 1970s. It was proceduralist insofar as it
tended to enforce procedural values-access, political speech, structures
of lawmaking and law execution-rather than substantive values. In
short, the Burger Court was activist, but in support of values it believed
were prevalent in Middle America.
In a manner consistent with its moderately activist posture in con-
stitutional cases, the Burger Court in statutory cases frequently invoked
clear statement rules to protect constitutional rights and structures. As
Llewellyn would have appreciated, however, the Court was also more
than ready to acknowledge exceptions and caveats to those clear state-
ment rules (counter-rules), or to ignore them altogether in cases in
which they were arguably relevant. Generally, the Burger Court's prac-
tice is epitomized by three "meta-rules": avoidance of interpretations
598 [Vol. 45:593
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which (1) unnecessarily invaded personal rights, (2) disturbed national
and international allocations of jurisdiction, or (3) upset state-federal
relations. We analyze these meta-rules in the following nine categories.
A. Rule to Avoid Constitutional Difficulties
Probably the most important of the constitutionally based canons
is the rule that "[w]hen the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn
in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it
is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a con-
struction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be
avoided."'7 The middle Burger Court often invoked this meta-rule, most
prominently in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago.8
The issue in Catholic Bishop was whether the National Labor Re-
lations Act's broad definition of the National Labor Relations Board's
jurisdiction justified the exercise of that jurisdiction over lay faculty at
parochial high schools. The Court began its analysis with the "values
enshrined in the First Amendment," and with the issue "whether the
Board's exercise of its jurisdiction here would give rise to serious consti-
tutional questions."9 Based upon its First Amendment precedents and
the importance of a teacher's role in the religious mission of a church
school, the Court concluded that there was a "significant risk that the
First Amendment will be infringed"' 0 by a broad interpretation of the
Board's jurisdiction and interpreted the statute narrowly.
Several other middle Burger Court opinions also interpreted stat-
utes to avoid constitutional concerns, protecting individual rights to
free exercise of religion, free speech, due process, and equal protection
through creative statutory interpretation." But, as if unconsciously
tracking Llewellyn, the Court always left itself an option to escape this
canon: not surprisingly, it did not apply when the statutory text was
unambiguous or the constitutional problems insubstantial. Thus, in
Beal v. Doe,'2 the Court interpreted Title XIX of the Social Security
7. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932), quoted in Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740,
749-50 (1961). See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
8. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
9. Id. at 501.
10. Id. at 504.
11. See St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 788 (1981)
(interpreting a tax statute narrowly to avoid free exercise problems); United States v. Clark, 445
U.S. 23, 33-34 (1980) (interpreting a civil service statute liberally to avoid possibly unconstitu-
tional discrimination against children born outside of marriage); Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S.
682 (1979) (interpreting a statute to reflect due process concerns for Social Security disability re-
cipients from whom recoupment is sought); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978)
(tracking free speech concerns in interpreting FCC power).
12. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
19921 599
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Act not to require the states to fund abortions for the needy, emphasiz-
ing the plain language of the statute and minimizing the constitutional
concerns raised by the dissenting opinion.
13
B. The Rule of Lenity
Resting upon such due process values as providing fair notice and
constraining prosecutorial discretion, the rule of lenity posits that
"when choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct
Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the har-
sher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in lan-
guage that is clear and definite."'14 This canon is closely related to the
rule to avoid constitutional difficulties, for a lenient interpretation of a
criminal statute obviates inquiries into underlying due process con-
cerns. The rule of lenity was a very popular canon during the middle
Burger Court.15
For example, in Chiarella v. United States," the Court interpreted
the criminal anti-fraud provision of the securities laws to be inapplica-
ble to an employee of a printing company who appropriated informa-
tion from page proofs to speculate on the stock market. Although there
was ample support for such liability based upon the statutory purpose
and evolving tort standards, the Court was reluctant to undertake an
expansion of criminal liability.
1
7
On the other hand, the Court in the late 1970s was willing to
apply criminal statutes to reach harsh results when the Court felt the
statutes were sufficiently clear." For example, in United States v.
13. Compare id. at 446 (focusing on plain meaning and insubstantial constitutional concerns)
with id. at 449 (Brennan dissenting) (arguing that the statute should be interpreted to avoid con-
stitutional problems). See also Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979); Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297 (1980).
14. United States v. Universal C.LT. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1952), quoted in
United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 297 (1971). See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S.
336 (1971).
15. See Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381 (1980) (adopting a lenient interpretation of
special parole provisions of a criminal drug statute); Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398 (1980)
(adopting a restrictive interpretation of firearm enhancement penalties); Dunn v. United States,
442 U.S. 100, 112-13 (1979) (adopting a narrow interpretation of what is a "proceeding ancillary to
a grand jury" for purposes of a false statement statute); United States v. United States Gypsum
Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978) (reading a mens rea requirement into Sherman Act criminal penalties);
Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 14-15 (1978) (applying the rule of lenity to a sentencing
provision).
16. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
17. Compare id. at 241-43 (Burger dissenting) and id. at 246-48 (Blackmun dissenting) with
id. at 233-34 (opinion of the Court).
18. Compare Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980) (interpreting a firearm control stat-
ute broadly because of the statute's plain meaning) with id. at 69 (Brennan dissenting) (applying
the rule of lenity and the rule to avoid constitutional difficulties). See also United States v. Bailey,
[Vol. 45:593
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Batchelder,19 the Court held that a defendant with a prior felony con-
viction was properly sentenced to five years imprisonment under Title
IV of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 for re-
ceiving firearms, even though Title VII of the statute provided a sen-
tence of only two years for the same conduct. The Court held that this
odd statutory overlap was the consequence of unambiguous statutory
language and traced the anomaly to decisions made by Congress in the
last-minute addition of Title VII to the Act.20 Thus, the Court found
that there was no room for the operation of the rule of lenity because
"there [was] no ambiguity to resolve."'" The Court also found the rule
to avoid constitutional difficulties inapplicable, because that "'"cardi-
nal principle" of statutory construction . .. is appropriate only when
[an alternative interpretation] is "fairly possible"' from the language of
the statute."2 The Court then upheld the statute, as construed, against
constitutional attack.
C. Presumption in Favor of Judicial Review
Responding to due process concerns that administrative action be
subject to independent check and review, the Court has posited that
"judicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved person will not
be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the
purpose of Congress."'" Like the rule of lenity, the presumption in favor
of judicial review might be considered a special case of the rule to avoid
constitutional difficulties. Also like the rule of lenity, in the late 1970s
this presumption sometimes resulted in allowing judicial review and
sometimes did not.
On the one hand, based in large part upon the reviewability pre-
sumption, the Court held in Dunlop v. Bachowski24 that the Secretary
of Labor's decision not to bring a Landrum-Griffin Act lawsuit to over-
turn an allegedly fraudulent union election was subject to judicial re-
view at the behest of the losing candidate, who did not have a private
444 U.S. 394 (1980) (interpreting a criminal escape statute broadly); United States v. Culbert, 435
U.S. 371, 379 (1978) (adopting a broad reading of the Hobbs Act).
19. 442 U.S. 114 (1979).
20. Id. at 119-21.
21. Id. at 121. "That [the statute] provides different penalties for essentially the same con-
duct is no justification for taking liberties with unequivocal statutory language." Id. at 121-22.
22. Id. at 122, quoting Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 378 n.11 (1977).
23. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967). The Court further stated that
"only upon a showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent should the
courts restrict access to judicial review." Id. at 141. See also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).
24. 421 U.S. 560 (1975).
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cause of action. 5 On the other hand, two years later the Court held in
Morris v. Gressette26 that the presumption did not justify judicial re-
view of the Attorney General's decision not to challenge a state voting
plan at the behest of voters claiming that the plan violated the Voting
Rights Act. The Court reasoned that judicial review would frustrate the
statutory scheme and that aggrieved voters had other remedies for the
claimed violations.
D. Liberal Construction of Statutes to Protect Carolene Groups
Responding to the same concerns that arguably have inspired the
Court's willingness to subject certain "suspect classifications" to strin-
gent equal protection analysis, the Court in the late 1970s tended to
interpret ambiguous statutes to benefit "discrete and insular minori-
ties" (Carolene groups). Unlike the canons described above, this canon
was not stated as such in general terms by the Court, but the canon can
be discerned from the Court's decisions stating interpretive presump-
tions favoring the group interests of African Americans, s Native Amer-
icans,29 and noncitizens,30 for ex~mple. Again, this canon did not assure
such groups that statutes would always be interpreted to favor their
interests, for the presumption was subject to a persuasive showing of
statutory meaning to the contrary.
Frequently, this presumption is closely related to the rule to avoid
constitutional difficulties. For example, in United States v. Clark,3 1 the
Court interpreted the Civil Service Retirement Act of 1948 provision
that gave deceased employees' benefits to nonmarital children only if
they "lived with the employee." Notwithstanding the longtime interpre-
tation of the provision to require the child to have been living with the
employee at the time of the latter's death (an interpretation apparently
25. Id. at 567-68 (starting with the reviewability presumption and finding no compelling evi-
dence to outweigh it).
26. 432 U.S. 491 (1977).
27. Id. at 505-07. Compare id. at 507 (Marshall dissenting) (relying on the Abbott Laborato-
ries/Bachowski presumption of judicial review).
28. See Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 to permit affirmative action favoring African American workers); United States v.
Board of Comm'rs of Sheffield, 435 U.S. 110, 126-28 (1978) (interpreting the Voting Rights Act
very broadly to effectuate Fifteenth Amendment values for protection of African Americans); Run-
yon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 1866 very expansively to
provide additional remedy to African Americans subject to job discrimination).
29. In construing Indian treaties, the Court has held that "'[d]oubtful expressions are to be
resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless people who are the wards of the nation, dependent
upon its protection and good faith.'" McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164,
174 (1973), quoting Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930).
30. See INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225 (1966).
31. 445 U.S. 23 (1980).
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accepted by Congress in the 1970s), '2 the Court interpreted the provi-
sion to require only that the child had lived with the employee at some
point. This interpretation avoided serious constitutional doubts about
the statute,33 and mirrored the Court's extension of special equal pro-
tection scrutiny to nonmarital children classifications in the late
1960s."'
This canon is further illustrated by the evolution of the Court's
approach to gender issues in statutory interpretation during the 1970s.
In the early and middle parts of the decade, the Court sent rather
mixed constitutional signals regarding gender-based statutes, 5 and
these mixed signals were paralleled in a reluctance to interpret statutes
to protect the interests of women.3 6 A turning point came after 1976,
when the Court adopted an intermediate level of heightened scrutiny
for classifications based upon gender.3 7 Thus, the latter half of the dec-
ade saw the Court interpret the employment discrimination statute (Ti-
tle VII) more aggressively to protect against gender discrimination s.3
E. Presumption of Consistency with International Law and
Treaties
The four constitutionally based canons explained above enabled
the Burger Court to protect individual or group rights rooted in the
Constitution, especially First Amendment, due process, and equal pro-
tection rights. But most of the constitutionally based canons in the late
1970s were drawn from structural features of the Constitution, namely,
its treatment of international obligations, separation of powers, and
federalism. We now turn to those structural canons, which the Burger
Court applied enthusiastically and somewhat more consistently than it
32. Id. at 31-34. See also id. at 36 (Rehnquist dissenting).
33. Id. at 27-28 (opinion of the Court).
34. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
35. Compare Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (holding that discrimination against
pregnant women is permissible under equal protection analysis) with Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973) (finding discrimination against female military personnel impermissible).
36. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (interpreting Title VII to allow
employers to discriminate against pregnant women), overridden by Pregnancy Discrimination Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
37. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
38. See Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (interpreting
Title VII to prohibit employers from requiring that female employees make larger contributions to
pension funds than male employees); Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977) (holding that
Title VII was violated by an employer policy denying accumulated leave to female employees re-
turning from pregnancy leave).
The Court's attitude toward pregnancy changed markedly after the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act overrode Gilbert, see note 36, and the Court's opinions thereafter tended to favor pregnant
women. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
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applied the canons protecting individual rights.
By operation of the supremacy clause, treaties as well as the
precepts of international law are the "supreme Law of the Land. '3 9 The
Court will "interpret general or ambiguous words in statutes in a man-
ner consistent with international law,"4 0 and, according to the Court,
"an Act of congress [sic] ought never to be construed to violate the law
of nations, if any other possible construction remains.""' Further, the
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law states that "courts do
not favor repudiation of an earlier international agreement by implica-
tion and require clear indications that Congress, in enacting subsequent
legislation, meant to supersede the earlier agreement. ' 42 International
law and treaties thus have a quasi-constitutional status: Congress can
override them, but it must do so clearly.
The Burger Court in the late 1970s and very early 1980s tended to
follow and apply the presumption of consistency with international ob-
ligations more consistently than it did the individual rights canons.43
The most dramatic example of this presumption in operation was
Dames & Moore v. Regan.44 In that case, the Court upheld the execu-
tive agreement that procured the return of fifty-two American hostages
from the Islamic Republic of Iran in return for the United States' re-
turn of frozen Iranian assets and referral of American lawsuits against
Iran to an international tribunal. The latter condition of the executive
agreement was very questionable under United States statutory law,
but the Court sidestepped those questions by reference to traditional
claims settlement practice under international law and previously nego-
tiated executive agreements.
F. Presumption Against Congressional Disruption of Traditional
Separation of National Powers
Arguably the most important of the constitutionally based canons
during the middle Burger Court was the presumption against congres-
39. U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2 (including treaties); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700
(1900) (acknowledging the supremacy of international law, also).
40. Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 3 comment j
(1965).
41. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
42. Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 145 comment b
(1965).
43. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 17 (1982) (relying in part on international agreements to
preempt state law); Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982) (interpreting a statutory reference
to "treaty" by reference to international law treatment of "executive agreements" as binding "trea-
ties"). See also United States v. California, 447 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1980) (interpreting a term used in the
Submerged Lands Act by reference to international convention).
44. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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sional disruption of traditional separation of national powers, either by
invading powers traditionally held by the other two branches or by giv-
ing away its own power without appropriate limits. This presumption
was nowhere stated as such in the Court's opinions during this period,
but was instead expressed through more particular canons.
1. Presumption Against Derogation of the Judiciary's Traditional
Equity Powers
On the one hand, Article III vests Congress both with virtually ple-
nary power over lower federal court jurisdiction and remedial authority
and with substantial power over Supreme Court jurisdiction and reme-
dial authority. The Court has drawn from this allocation of authority
the canon that statutes conferring jurisdiction upon federal courts
should be narrowly construed to assure that Congress and not the
courts make decisions about the extent of jurisdiction.45 On the other
hand, Article III vests the "judicial Power" in the Supreme Court and
whatever lower courts Congress creates.4 The Court has drawn from
this allocation of power the proposition that once Congress has vested
federal courts with jurisdiction, it is presumed to vest them with all the
traditional facets of the "judicial Power.
'47
Illustratively, the Court in Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper48 held
that the federal costs statute does not authorize a federal court to as-
sess counsel fees against a litigant abusing the judicial process; the
Court relied on the apparent congressional expectations in enacting and
amending the costs statute over time. But the Court further held that
the costs statute did not displace a court's "inherent power" to disci-
pline litigants through contempt sanctions, including the imposition of
counsel fees against a contemptuous litigant.49
45. See Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908) (addressing fed-
eral question jurisdiction); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806) (addressing diver-
sity jurisdiction). Leading cases applying this proposition during the early and middle Burger
Court were Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978); Aldinger v. Howard, 427
U.S. 1 (1976); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S.
332 (1969).
46. U.S. Const., Art. III, § 1.
47. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 330 (1944) (stating that "if Congress desired to make
such an abrupt departure from traditional equity, practice . . .'it would have made its desire
plain"). See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 319 (1982).
48. 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
49. Id. at 764-67.
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2. Presumption Against Derogation of the President's Traditional
Powers
Article II vests the President with the "executive Power," including
very substantial power over military and foreign affairs.50 Based upon
this allocation of power, the Court has presumed that when Congress
passes laws dealing with foreign affairs and other matters in which con-
gressional and executive power interact, Congress does not intend to
interfere with traditional executive functions.5 1 The Burger Court was
quite enthusiastic about this canon, though it had few occasions to ap-
ply it.5
2
Again, Dames & Moore is the best example from the middle period
of the Burger Court of the power of this canon. Just as the Court in
Piper found no legislative authorization for assessing counsel fees
against abusive litigants, the Court in Dames & Moore found no statu-
tory authorization for the executive agreement shuttling U.S. lawsuits
from federal court into international arbitration. 3 Nonetheless, the
Court held that the President's executive agreement was entitled to le-
gal effect under the supremacy clause because the President's foreign
affairs powers included authority to settle foreign claims, at least during
foreign policy emergencies, 54 and because Congress's failure to object to
the President's longtime exercise of such power amounted to legislative
"acquiescence" in its exercise.55 Dames & Moore was a powerful invoca-
tion of the presumption against derogation of the President's tradi-
tional powers because it was in tension with three separate statutory
schemes and with the rule to avoid constitutional difficulties raised by
the wholesale transfer of lawsuits to a less formal tribunal. 6
3. Presumption Against Excessive Delegation of Legislative Powers
Article I vests Congress with the "legislative Power" in the federal
government, and Article I, section 7 sets forth the procedures for legis-
50. See U.S. Const., Art. II, § 1, c. 1; id. § 2.
51. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Zemel v. Rusk,
381 U.S. 1, 12 (1965).
52. See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221, 232-33 (1986) (utiliz-
ing very creative statutory interpretation, essentially deferring to a bilateral understanding be-
tween Japan and the President of the U.S.); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 301 & n.50 (1981)
(presuming that Congress had acquiesced in the President's traditional authority to regulate
passports).
53. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 675-79.
54. Id. at 688 (limiting the decision to cases involving settlements that are "necessary inci-
dent[s] to the resolution of a major foreign policy dispute between our country and another").
55. Id. at 678-83.
56. Id. at 689-90 (dismissing the constitutional issue as not ripe for consideration). See also
id. at 690-91 (Powell concurring in part and dissenting in part).
[Vol. 45:593
CLEAR STATEMENT RULES
lating statutes.57 The old "nondelegation doctrine" is supposed to police
against excessive congressional delegation of its own lawmaking powers
to agencies as a matter of constitutional law, but the Court has not in-
validated a statute on those grounds since the 1930s. Instead, the Court
now refers to the nondelegation idea as a canon of statutory interpreta-
tion rather than as an enforceable constitutional doctrine.
5 8
At least one case in the middle Burger Court might exemplify this
canon. In Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petro-
leum Institute,59 the Court invalidated an OSHA rule that prohibited
workplace exposure to traces of benzene, based upon a statutory delega-
tion to OSHA to assure a "safe or healthful" workplace. The plurality
opinion of four justices emphasized OSHA's inadequate cost-benefit
analysis, but Justice Rehnquist's critical fifth vote was based on the
conclusion that the delegation of rulemaking power to OSHA was un-
constitutionally broad.60 At least some of the majority Justices were
concerned that heavy costs were being imposed upon employers without
a clear mandate from Congress. This view of American Petroleum In-
stitute is in tension with the Court's decision in Dames & Moore, which
permitted even more sweeping costs upon U.S. litigants based upon a
delegation of lawmaking power to the President through congressional
''acquiescence."
G. Presumption Against Federal Derogation of Traditional State
Functions
There is a tension in the Constitution between the supremacy
clause, which mandates that federal statutes are the "law of the Land"
and therefore trump state law, and the underlying principles of "feder-
alism" reflected in Article I and the Tenth Amendment. For many
years, the Supreme Court has dealt with this tension by giving prefer-
ence to federal law (it "preempts" state law where there is a conflict),
but with a canonical caveat: When a state's exercise of its police power
is challenged under the supremacy clause, the Court "start[s] with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress."'"
The Burger Court was enthusiastic about this canon, but did not
invoke it as a heavy presumption to preserve state regulatory power.2 A
57. U.S. Const., Art. I, §§ 1, 7.
58. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 n.7 (1989).
59. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
60. Id. at 671 (Rehnquist concurring).
61. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
62. See, for example, Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
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particularly interesting application came in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield
Co.,6 3 which evaluated the Washington Tanker Law's regulation of the
design, size, and movement of oil tankers in Puget Sound. The Court
invalidated most of the state's pilot licensing requirement because it
was explicitly preempted by federal statute (clear statement trumps the
canon), and invalidated the state's safety standards because they were
inconsistent with the federal goal of creating national uniformity as
part of an international negotiating process (presumption of conformity
to international obligations). 4 On the other hand, the Court sustained a
pilotage requirement not explicitly preempted by federal statute, as
well as a tugboat escort requirement that did not interfere with the fed-
eral uniformity purpose, because these regulations served important
state functions and did not seriously interfere with the federal
scheme. 5
H. Presumption that Intergovernmental Immunities Not Be
Disturbed
Inherent in the constitutional structure is the idea that the federal
and state governments not interfere with one another's core governmen-
tal operations.6 The Eleventh Amendment specifically embodies at
least part of that concept in its provision that "[t]he Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.'67 Although the Eleventh Amendment has long been broadly in-
terpreted to prohibit various types of lawsuits against the states beyond
those mentioned in the amendment, the Burger Court held that Con-
gress acting under its powers to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment
could abrogate state Eleventh Amendment immunity. 8
Nonetheless, the Burger Court presumed against interpreting fed-
eral statutes to invade the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. In
Employees of the Department of Public Health & Welfare v. Depart-
ment of Public Health & Welfare, Missouri,69 the Court held that Con-
gress's 1966 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) did
not abrogate state immunity against FLSA lawsuits. Although the
63. 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
64. Id. at 160-68.
65. Id. at 168-73. See also id. at 179-80.
66. See, for example, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheaton) 316 (1819).
67. U.S. Const., Amend. XI.
68. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
69. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
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amendments did extend the FLSA's coverage to state employees, Con-
gress did not amend the statute's remedial provision to suggest abroga-
tion of state immunity, nor was there any mention in the legislative
history that Congress believed it was abrogating state immunity. The
Court was simply not willing "to infer that Congress . . . desired si-
lently to deprive the States of an immunity they have long enjoyed.M
0
L Presumption of Tribal Immunity from State Regulation
The constitutional and precedential backdrops to the canon
presuming that Indian tribes and their reservations are immune from
state regulation are complex and need only be outlined here.7 1 In the
face of constitutional silence on the key questions, 72 Chief Justice Mar-
shall concluded that a tribe is a unique sovereign having a special rela-
tionship with the federal government, 73 and that states have no
regulatory power in "Indian country. 1 74 Later decisions have eroded
this flat rule against state assertions of authority in Indian country.75
Under decisions holding that Congress has "plenary power" to regulate
tribes and their members,76 Congress may delegate authority over In-
dian country to the states. Moreover, even when not armed with a fed-
eral delegation of authority, states may sometimes regulate in Indian
country.
In the middle years of the Burger Court, a substantive canon was
sometimes used to temper state intrusions into Indian country that
were arguably authorized by Congress. For example, in Bryan v. Itasca
70. Id. at 285. See id. at 293-94 (Marshall concurring in the result).
71. On federal Indian law generally and statutory interpretation in that field in particular,
see Robert Clinton, et al., American Indian Law: Cases and Materials (Michie, 3d ed. 1991);
Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal
Indian Law, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 1137 (1990).
72. In the three places in which it mentions Indians, the Constitution does not speak clearly
about the sovereignty of tribes or whether states have any authority to regulate Indian lands. See
U.S. Const., Art I., § 2, cl. 3; id., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3; id., Amend. XIV, § 2.
73. Marshall described an Indian tribe "as a state, as a distinct political society, separated
from others, capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself." Cherokee Nation v. Geor-
gia, 30 U.S. (5 Peters) 1, 16 (1831). Unlike foreign nations or states of the union, tribes are "do-
mestic dependent nations," he wrote, whose relation to the federal government "resembles that of
a ward to his guardian." Id. at 17.
74. Marshall concluded that an Indian reservation is "a distinct community occupying its
own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of [the state] can have no
force." Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Peters) 515, 561 (1832). "Indian country" is a term of art
that is defined to include lands within the boundaries of Indian reservations as well as "dependent
Indian communities" and Indian allotments existing outside a reservation. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151
(1988) (addressing federal criminal jurisdiction); DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425,
427 n.2 (1975) (borrowing this statutory definition for civil jurisdictional purposes).
75. See, for example, Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
76. See generally Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and
Limitations, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 195 (1984).
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County,7 7 the Court invoked the canon to rebuff a county's attempt to
impose a nondiscriminatory personal property tax upon a mobile home
owned and occupied by an Indian on a reservation located in the
county. Despite federal statutory language that could have been read as
delegating this authority to the county, 8 the Court held that state
power was "foreclosed by the legislative history ... and the application
of canons of construction applicable to congressional statutes claimed
to terminate Indian immunities. '7 9 The substantive canon-phrased as
requiring that a congressional intent to terminate Indian immunities
"'be expressed on the face of the Act or be clear from the surrounding
circumstances and legislative history' "8°-probably strongly influenced
the outcome, because the legislative history provided little direct sup-
port for the Court's conclusions.8 "
In its middle years, the Burger Court also occasionally used a sub-
stantive canon to exclude unilateral state assertions of authority to reg-
ulate in Indian country. In White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,
8 2
for example, the Court concluded that federal law preempted a state's
attempt to impose a motor carrier license tax and an excise or use fuel
tax upon a non-Indian company performing logging operations in In-
dian country under contract with a tribal enterprise. Nothing in federal
law provided an express or clearly implied preemption, but the Court
relied on a piesumption against state authority: "Ambiguities in federal
law have been construed generously in order to comport with. . tradi-
tional notions of [tribal] sovereignty and with the federal policy of en-
couraging tribal independence."8 3 The Court concluded that the factors
favoring this special kind of preemption-comprehensive federal regu-
lation of the harvesting and sale of timber, the federal policy promoting
tribal economic self-sufficiency, and the fact that the economic inci-
dence of the tax fell upon the tribe-outweighed the state's "genera-
lized interest in raising revenue."84
As Llewellyn would have expected, the Burger Court's middle years
also included some cases in which the Indian law canon failed to pro-
77. 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
78. Parsed most favorably to the county, the statutory language said that "civil laws of [the]
State. . . of general application to private persons and private property shall have the same force
and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State," and it provided
exceptions to this grant of authority in Indian country for certain state taxes, but not the kind of
tax at issue in the case. 18 U.S.C. § 1360(a), (b) (1988).
79. 426 U.S. at 379.
80. Id. at 393, quoting Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 504-05 (1973).
81. For a more complete discussion of Bryan, including the legislative history at issue, see
Frickey, 78 Cal. L. Rev. at 1166-68, 1179, 1212, 1214 n.377, 1240 (cited in note 71).
82. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
83. Id. at 143-44.
84. Id. at 151.
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duce the outcomes one might expect. Illustratively, in Washington v.
Yakima Indian Nation,5 the Court interpreted a federal statute al-
lowing states to assume criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian coun-
try as authorizing a state to pick and choose a partial, patchwork
jurisdiction over that domain based on geographical and subject-matter
factors. As Justice Marshall's dissent stressed, nowhere in the major-
ity's discussion of this issue was consideration given to the canonical
presumption against state regulation in Indian country and the need for
clear federal delegations of authority."' Similarly, in Moe v. Salish &
Kootenai Tribes8 7 the Court upheld a state's authority to collect taxes
on sales of cigarettes in Indian country by Indians to non-Indians. Pre-
sumptions against state regulation in Indian country were conspicu-
ously absent in the opinion, with the preemption inquiry phrased as
merely a search for an actual conflict between federal statutes and state
laws. The tension between the garden-variety federal preemption ap-
proach of Moe and the special, canonical Indian law preemption/bal-
ancing approach of Bracker was left unresolved by the Burger Court.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF SUPER-STRONG CLEAR STATEMENT RULES:
LOCALIZING VALUES IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The later years of the Burger Court and the early years of the
Rehnquist Court have not involved a radical change in the catalogue of
constitutionally based canons. But the Court in the 1980s did approach
these canons in a very different way than it had in the 1970s. Several
developments are worth noting. First, the Court has been more uneven
in its willingness to interpret federal statutes to avoid clashes with indi-
vidual liberties recognized in the Constitution. For example, the rule to
avoid constitutional difficulties has been much more controversial dur-
ing the Rehnquist Court than it was in the Burger Court and has rarely
been invoked to protect individual liberties. Second, although the Court
has not retreated from its enthusiasm for canons drawn from national
and international structures in the Constitution, its most important
move in this arena has been to reinterpret an old referential ca-
non-deference to administrative interpretations of statutes-to reflect
constitutional structures.
Third, and most interestingly, the Court has enforced the federal-
ism-based canons much more enthusiastically in the 1980s than it did
in the 1970s. One way the Court has expressed its enthusiasm is
through the creation of a series of "super-strong clear statement rules,"
85. 439 U.S. 463 (1979).
86. Id. at 503 (Marshall dissenting).
87. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
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which establish very strong presumptions of statutory meaning that can
be rebutted only through unambiguous statutory text targeted at the
specific problem. The Court's creation of super-strong clear statement
rules for the federalism-based canons is particularly interesting, for the
Court's activism in statutory interpretation has been accompanied by
its virtual abandonment of constitutional activism on federalism issues.
In other words, "quasi-constitutional law," the reading into statutes of
constitutional values subject only to clear legislative override, has re-
placed constitutional law, the invalidation of federal statutes, as the
way in which the Court is enforcing "our federalism."
A. The Court's Uneven Application of the Individual Rights
Canons, 1981-91
The Supreme Court in the 1980s continued to recognize the indi-
vidual rights canons-the rule to avoid constitutional difficulties, the
rule of lenity, and the presumption in favor of judicial review. 8 But the
Court showed less enthusiasm for these canons. However uneven the
Court was in protecting individual liberties through statutory interpre-
tation in the 1970s, it was significantly less protective in the 1980s. This
evolution was particularly apparent in cases pitting powerful groups in
American society against marginalized ones, and the Court has aban-
doned most of the presumptions that in the 1970s favored Carolene
groups.
Through the 1960s and 1970s, the Warren and Burger Courts inter-
preted civil rights statutes very liberally to protect the interests of the
classic Carolene group, African Americans. In the 1980s, the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts interpreted the same statutes much more restric-
tively. The trend in the Court's decisions was that if African American
interests were aligned against those of another marginal group, the
Court was often willing to interpret the statute to favor African Ameri-
cans; but if their interests were aligned against those of a politically
powerful group, the Court tended to favor the powerful group.
For example, in Bob Jones University v. United States,89 a virtu-
ally unanimous Court rewrote the Internal Revenue Code to deny tax
exemptions to educational institutions that openly discriminated
against African Americans. Although the decision is a powerful applica-
tion of the Carolene canon, it had only narrow impact, because the only
88. See Burns v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2182, 2187 (1991) (avoiding due process
problems); McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, 111 S. Ct. 888, 898-99 (1991) (applying the pre-
sumption of judicial review); Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990) (applying the rule
of lenity); Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989) (avoiding Seventh Amendment
problems); United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 939 (1988) (applying the rule of lenity).
89. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
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schools effectively penalized by it were those like Bob Jones University,
an outlier fundamentalist school that openly discriminated because of
religious conviction. Most schools that discriminate do so covertly, or
even unconsciously, and Bob Jones has little effect on such covert dis-
crimination. The IRS did not apply the Bob Jones rule to schools that
discriminated more covertly, and in Allen v. Wrighte° the Burger Court
made it hard for African Americans to sue the IRS to secure effective
enforcement.
Perhaps more dramatically, the Supreme Court of the 1980s was
almost never willing to interpret statutes to effectuate the rights of Af-
rican Americans and other racial minorities to be free of workplace dis-
crimination when their interests were opposed by employer and union
groups. 1 The Court's abandonment of the Carolene canon protecting
racial minorities took on the appearance of outright hostility in a series
of six decisions handed down in May and June of 1989.92 These deci-
sions, which have triggered the most dramatic civil rights override since
the Reconstruction Amendments overrode Dred Scott,9 s reinterpreted
Title VII and related job discrimination statutes in ways that made it
more difficult for African Americans to challenge workplace
discrimination.
Notwithstanding the uproar over its 1989 decisions, subsequent job
discrimination decisions have only reinforced the impression that the
Court has abandoned the Carolene canon favoring racial minorities. For
example, in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Company,94 the Court in-
terpreted Title VII not to prohibit United States companies from dis-
criminating against racial minorities who are employed outside of the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States, notwithstanding the broad
wording of Title VII.
90. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
91. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (plurality opinion
increasing burden of proof for Title VII claimants); American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S.
63 (1982) (protecting pre-1964 seniority systems against Title VII attack); Mohasco Corp. v. Silver,
447 U.S. 807 (1980) (strictly enforcing the confusing limitations period in Title VII).
92. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989) (interpreting Title
VII's counsel fees provision conservatively); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164
(1989) (reinterpreting Section 1981 not to provide a remedy for African American workers fired
because of race); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 490 U.S. 900 (1989) (containing a stingy inter-
pretation of the Title VII statute of limitations); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (permitting
repeated challenges to Title VII consent decrees by workers later harmed by affirmative action);
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (tightening the burden of proof for Title
VII claimants); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (providing employers with a
new Title VII defense).
93. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). The beginnings
of this story are told in William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? The Court/Congress/Presi-
dent Game, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 613 (1991).
94. 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
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Whatever vitality the Carolene canon favoring racial minorities
had in the Burger Court has for the time being been extinguished in the
Rehnquist Court. Interestingly, and at the same time, the Rehnquist
Court has continued to apply the Carolene canon favoring women in
workplace situations. 5 Thus the Rehnquist Court has extended Title
VII to permit affirmative action for women,98 to prohibit employer poli-
cies discriminating against potentially pregnant women to protect the
fetus,97 to permit state regulation discriminating in favor of women,98
and to protect women against sexual harassment in the workplace.99 Al-
though middle-class and working women have had some successes dur-
ing the Rehnquist Court, pregnant women desiring abortions, and
especially women who are poor, have not fared so well, reflecting the
Rehnquist Court's ambivalence on the abortion issue. In this context,
the most striking case involving the Rehnquist Court's changing atti-
tude toward canons protecting individual liberties is Rust v. Sullivan.1°°
In Rust, the Court upheld a Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) rule prohibiting doctors in a federally funded program
from providing any information or counseling regarding abortion to
pregnant women. Three dissenting justices argued that this interpreta-
tion of the statute violated both the First Amendment right of the doc-
tors to provide advice to patients and the Fifth Amendment right of the
patients to obtain abortions.10 1 Dissenting separately, Justice O'Connor
relied on the canon to avoid difficult constitutional issues, an approach
which would seem tailor-made for the case because the statute was
open-ended and the constitutionally suspect rule was one recently de-
vised by HHS after twenty years of allowing such consultations. "If we
rule solely on statutory grounds, Congress retains the power to force the
constitutional question by legislating more explicitly," explained Justice
O'Connor. "That decision should be left to Congress; we should not tell
Congress what it cannot do before it has chosen to do it. ' ' 102
Rust v. Sullivan is important in several respects. It is concrete evi-
dence of the Rehnquist Court's constitutional skepticism about abor-
tion. However much the Court may interpret job discrimination
statutes in favor of middle class working women, the Court is not will-
ing to extend that Carolene canon to abortion situations. Moreover,
95. Unless the woman is a woman of color. See Patterson, 491 U.S. 164.
96. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
97. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
98. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
99. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
100. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
101. Id. at 1778 (Blackmun dissenting).
102. Id. at 1789 (O'Connor dissenting).
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Rust suggests the possibility that the canon to avoid difficult constitu-
tional issues may be a less efficacious protection for individual liberties
during the Rehnquist Court than it was even in the late Burger Court.
Perhaps significantly, in the leading Rehnquist Court case invoking the
canon, the "difficult" constitutional issue involved separation of powers
(asserted congressional invasion of the presidential appointments
power) and not individual rights.10 3 Finally, Rust may be significant in
the Court's willingness to uphold arguably unauthorized agency action
in the face of difficult constitutional issues. This deference to the execu-
tive branch is related to the Court's treatment of national and interna-
tional structures through the canons, to which we now turn.
B. The National and International Powers Canons: Protecting the
Prerogatives of the Executive, 1981-91
Like the Court in the 1970s, the Court in the 1980s was most en-
thusiastic about applying canons of interpretation to protect the struc-
tures of our national separation of powers and of international
understandings. 10 4 Separation of powers was also a major theme of the
Court's constitutional jurisprudence during the 1980s, though the Court
waffled famously in its decisions. Nonetheless, the 1980s witnessed a
dramatic change in the way the Court actually pursued these themes. In
our view, the unifying element is an apparent hostility to the exercise of
congressional power, in stark contrast to the Court's endorsement of
broad presidential power. As evidence, we point to the Rehnquist
Court's reformulation of two traditional presumptions as clear state-
ment rules and its reformulation of one Burger Court clear statement
rule as a new super-strong clear statement rule.
1. Rule Against Extraterritorial Effect of Statutes
In EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco),05 the
Court recognized the power of Congress to pass statutes that have effect
beyond the boundaries of the United States. But the Court countered
that actual power with an old canon of construction as to its presumed
103. Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989). The second leading Rehn-
quist Court invocation of this canon, Gomez, 490 U.S. at 864, involved jury trial rights, but the
Court has narrowly interpreted Gomez in a subsequent decision involving the same statutory pro-
vision. See Peretz v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2661, 2666-67 (1991).
104. See Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123 (1991) (applying the rule that Congress
does not displace the Court's inherent powers); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373 n.7 (suggesting the
presumption against excessive delegation of congressional power); Morrison, 487 U.S. at 682-83
(interpreting a special prosecutor statute narrowly to avoid congressional invasion of executive
prosecutorial power).
105. 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
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exercise, namely, "'that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent
appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States.' -1o6 According to the Court, the canon serves to protect
against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations
which could result in international discord. The Court expressed the
canon as a clear statement rule, to be displaced only by clear statutory
language, which the Court did not find in the broadly phrased mandate
of Title VII.
The dissenting opinion in Aramco presented a broad array of argu-
ments suggesting that Congress in 1964 assumed that Title VII would
apply to United States employees of United States companies, even
those working abroad.107 The dissent also argued that the Court's opin-
ion transformed an old "presumption" into a new and more powerful
"clear statement rule" that is in practice much harder to rebut: "Clear
statement rules operate less to reveal actual congressional intent than
to shield important values from an insufficiently strong legislative in-
tent to displace them."' 0 8 While clear statement rules can only be
trumped by statutory text, presumptions are merely one type of evi-
dence the Court will consider, in combination with statutory text, legis-
lative history, and other sources.
Most interestingly, the Aramco clear statement rule relies for its
potency on considerations of international comity, even though such
concerns are usually minimal when United States law regulates the con-
duct of United States companies toward United States citizens. This is
even more anomalous when one compares Aramco with Rehnquist
Court decisions giving an exceedingly narrow construction to interna-
tional conventions entered into by the United States and foreign coun-
tries regarding service of process and discovery in transnational
litigation.' In these decisions, the Rehnquist Court has been willing to
negate international as well as congressional expectations when they
run against settled United States practice and procedure. What ties to-
gether Aramco and these cases is the theme that the Court is now mak-
ing it harder for Congress to subject United States companies to new
106. Id. at 1230, quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
107. Id. at 1240-44 (Marshall dissenting).
108. Id. at 1238.
109. Compare Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988) (holding
that the Hague Service Convention does not apply when a United States subsidiary is served as an
agent of a foreign corporation) with id. at 714-16 (Brennan concurring in the judgment) (observing
that international expectations were that the Hague Convention would apply). Compare Societe
Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987) (holding
that the Hague Evidence Convention provides an optional but not exclusive way to obtain foreign
evidence from a foreign litigant) with id. at 554-58 (Blackmun dissenting) (noting that interna-
tional expectations were that the Hague Convention would be the exclusive mechanism).
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duties and obligations when they are acting transnationally.
2. Super-Strong Rule Against Congressional Derogation of
Presidential Foreign Affairs Power
In cases such as Dames & Moore, the middle Burger Court declined
to interpret statutes to curtail the President's foreign affairs powers.
This clear statement rule became stronger in the late 1980s. The best
example is Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Soci-
ety,110 in which the Court held that the Department of Justice did not
violate the Packwood and Pelly Amendments when it failed to certify
Japan's whaling practices to an international remedial body as an ap-
parent violation of international agreements. Yet the Pelly Amendment
on its face directed the Department to certify whether "nationals of a
foreign country, directly or indirectly, are conducting fishing operations
in a manner or under circumstances which diminish the effectiveness of
an international fishery conservation program."''
The Court concluded that it was not clear that Japan's practices,
which regularly exceeded the international limits, "diminish[ed] the ef-
fectiveness" of those limits within the meaning of the Pelly Amend-
ment." 2 According to the Court, the executive branch therefore enjoyed
considerable discretion as to when it was required by statute to certify
violations. This holding is a strained reading of the statutory text and is
strongly contrary to the Pelly Amendment's legislative history.113 What
seemed to move the Court was the argument that the President needed
flexibility not to certify so that he could negotiate a bilateral agreement
with Japan on this matter. If that is so, Japan Whaling has trans-
formed the Dames & Moore clear statement rule permitting Congress to
abrogate traditional presidential powers only through a clear statement
in the statutory text into a super-strong clear statement rule requiring
the statutory clear statement to target the specific issue unmistakably.
The super-strong clear statement rule in Japan Whaling protects presi-
dential discretion in foreign affairs matters somewhat more than the
ordinary clear statement rule in Dames & Moore.
110. 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
111. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(1) (1988). The Packwood Amendment followed the same certifica-
tion process but required that it be expedited and removed the President's discretion not to im-
pose sanctions. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2) (1988).
112. Japan Whaling, 478 U.S. at 232-33.
113. See id. at 247 (Marshall dissenting).
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3. Rule Deferring to Agency Interpretations
The most important canonical development in the 1980s on na-
tional and international matters was the Court's creation of a clear
statement rule deferring to agency interpretations. Before the 1980s,
the Court had long deferred to agency interpretations of statutes the
agencies were charged with enforcing, more as a practical, referential
canon than as a clear statement rule inspired by constitutional consid-
erations.114 The Court in the 1980s transformed that traditional canon
by imbuing it with constitutional significance and giving it more bite.
The first step came in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council."5 The Court reversed an appellate decision that had
overturned a new EPA rule based upon the lower court's examination
of legislative assumptions at the time the statute was passed. The Su-
preme Court held that the lower court had been insufficiently deferen-
tial to the agency's interpretation of a broadly worded statute. The
Court grounded its holding in separation of powers terms. To the extent
that Congress has left policy decisions ambiguous in statutes it passes,
it is constitutionally less legitimate for unelected judges to make those
policy choices than it is for executive agencies, which are responsible to
the President, an elected official, to make them. Chevron transformed a
practical, referential canon into a rule directly inspired by constitu-
tional considerations.
Although suggestive, Chevron left open the question of what evi-
dence a court can consider in deciding whether an agency interpretation
is contrary to the statute. In K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,1" 6 the Court
seemed to say that a court may only consider the statutory text and
structure in determining whether an agency interpretation is valid, sug-
gesting the possibility that legislative history contrary to the agency in-
terpretation would not suffice. As applied by the Court, the Chevron
clear statement rule is the following: Unless refuted by the clear lan-
guage of the statute, a court must defer to the agency interpretation.
17
The Chevron rule has pervaded the Court's statutory interpretation
114. See, for example, Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965). The Burger Court, for example,
required a formal delegation of rulemaking authority to an agency before it would defer. See Gen-
eral Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140 (1976). This may be changing in the current Court.
Compare Aramco, 111 S. Ct. at 1236-37 (Scalia concurring in part and in the judgment).
115. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
116. 486 U.S. 281 (1988).
117. See also Pauley v. Bethendrgy Mines, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2524, 2534 (1991); Cottage Say.
Ass'n v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 1503 (1991); Martin v. OSHRC, 111 S. Ct. 1171 (1991); Mobil Oil
Exploration & Prod. v. United Distribution Cos., 111 S. Ct. 615, 623 (1991); Sullivan v. Everhart,




cases in the last several years and is an important explanation for Ja-
pan Whaling and Rust v. Sullivan.
C. The Federalism Canons: The Court's New Super-Strong Clear
Statement Rules, 1981-91
The most remarkable development in the 1980s was the greater en-
thusiasm the Court brought to the federalism-based canons. The Court
not only created new canons reflecting federalism-based values, but also
transformed some of the existing clear statement rules into super-
strong clear statement rules. What is even more remarkable about these
developments is that they occurred during a period in which the Court
was abandoning any role in enforcing federalism values through consti-
tutional interpretation. Consider the following array of clear statement
rules and super-strong clear statement rules.
1. Rule Against Federal Conditions on State Administration of
Federal/State Programs with Federal Funding
The decade of the 1980s began with a dramatic signal that the Su-
preme Court would use interpretive activism through clear statement
canons to promote its vision of cooperative federalism. In Pennhurst
State School and Hospital v. Halderman"18 the federal statute in ques-
tion,119 which provided financial assistance to states for the care and
treatment of the developmentally disabled, included a bill of rights
stating that people with mental disabilities have a "right" to "appropri-
ate treatment" in the "least restrictive" environment. 20 In holding that
the statute did not create enforceable rights against participating
states, Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court acknowledged that
"Congress may fix the terms on which it shall disburse federal money to
the States.''2 The Court, however, then tempered congressional power
to attach strings to federal money flowing to states with a new clear
statement rule:
[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a
contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally im-
posed conditions. The legitimacy of Congress's power to legislate under the spend-
ing power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the
terms of the "contract." . . . There can, of course, be no knowing acceptance if a
State is unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it.
Accordingly, if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal mon-
eys, it must do so unambiguously. . . .By insisting that Congress speak with a
118. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
119. The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975, Pub. L. No.
94-103, 89 Stat. 486, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6000 et. seq. (1988).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1988).
121. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17.
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clear voice, we enable the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the
consequences of their participation.'
22
This formulation is reminiscent of the famous requirement of a "know-
ing and voluntary waiver" of individual constitutional rights 23 that fre-
quently arises in another quasi-contractual setting, plea bargaining.
Pennhurst created its canon by analogy to the longstanding canon
requiring a clear congressional abrogation of a state's Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity to suit in federal court. 24 Later in the opinion, the
Court stated that its canon "applies with greatest force where, as here,
a State's potential obligations under the Act are largely indeterminate,"
and stressed that the "crucial inquiry . . . [is] whether Congress spoke
so clearly that we can fairly say that the State could make an informed
choice" to undertake the obligations in question. 2 5 In dissent, Justice
White complained that precedent had not suggested, much less held,
"that Congress is required to condition its grant of funds with contract-
like exactitude," and that "Eleventh Amendment concerns are not im-
plicated in these cases. "126
The Court in Pennhurst stated in dictum that "[tihere are limits
on the power of Congress to impose conditions on the States pursuant
to its spending power.' 27 Later in the 1980s, however, the Rehnquist
Court, in an opinion by its Chief Justice, uncoupled any linkage be-
tween judicial aggressiveness at the constitutional level and at the in-
terpretive level in situations like Pennhurst. In South Dakota v.
Dole,'2 the Court held that Congress could constitutionally condition a
state's receipt of highway funds upon the state's illegalizing drinking by
those under twenty-one years of age. The Court indicated that condi-
tions on federal funds that do not violate parts of the Constitution
other than the spending clause are subject only to the minimal require-
ment of being in pursuit of "the general welfare," a question on which
"courts should defer substantially to the judgment of Congress."' 29 In
122. Id.
123. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
124. At the end of the block quotation in the text cited at note 122, the Court in Pennhurst
included a "Cf." cite to Employees of the Dep't of Public Health & Welfare v. Department of
Public Health & Welfare, discussed in text accompanying notes 69-70.
125. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 24-25.
126. Id. at 48 n.14 (White dissenting),
127. Id. at 17 n.13 (opinion of the Court).
128. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
129. Id. at 207. Chief Justice Rehnquist also said that "our cases have suggested (without
significant elaboration) that conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated
'to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs.'" Id., quoting Massachusetts v.
United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978). Presumably this "rational relationship" test, if applied at
all, would be undertaken very deferentially, in light of the Court's deference in determining
whether an exercise of the spending power promotes the general welfare.
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considering limitations on the spending power, South Dakota v. Dole
quoted the Pennhurst canon, and in context this clear statement rule
seems to be the only meaningful constraint. 130 Thus, judicial aggressive-
ness at the interpretive level correlates with judicial deference at the
constitutional level.
2. Super-Strong Rule Against Congressional Waiver of States'
Eleventh Amendment Immunity from Suit in Federal Court
The Eleventh Amendment canon, alive and well but lacking Hercu-
lean power in the middle years of the Burger Court,13' underwent a ste-
roidal transformation in the 1980s. What had once been a presumption-
based approach to resolve federal statutory ambiguity-after statutory
language, legislative history, and other factors were consulted-became
a super-strong clear statement rule focusing on statutory language alone
and requiring a very clear statement by Congress. In Atascadero State
Hospital v. Scanlon,32 Justice Powell's opinion for the Court concluded
that "Congress may abrogate the States' constitutionally secured immu-
nity from suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistaka-
bly clear in the language of the statute."' 33 Stressing that abrogation of
Eleventh Amendment immunity, though within congressional power,
disrupts the "'constitutionally mandated balance of power' ",134 be-
tween the federal governments and the states, the Court stated that "it
is incumbent upon the federal courts to be certain of Congress's intent
before finding that federal law overrides the guarantees of the Eleventh
Amendment. The requirement that Congress unequivocally express this
intention in the statutory language ensures such certainty."' 35 In dis-
sent, Justice Brennan complained that the freshly minted requirement
130. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08. In this period the death knell probably occurred in 1985
for any attempt to use constitutional law to cabin conditional federal grants to states. In Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), the Court overruled National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which had held that the federal power to regulate
interstate commerce could not constitutionally be used to regulate certain core state functions.
The National League of Cities limitation on the commerce power would have been somewhat
analogous to federalism-based constitutional limits on the spending power. Pennhurst cited Na-
tional League of Cities with a "see" citation following its dictum positing constitutional limits on
the spending power. See 451 U.S. at 17 n.13. By 1987, when the Court addressed South Dakota v.
Dole, National League of Cities had been overruled. For discussion of the demise of National
League of Cities as a constitutional matter and the corresponding rise of a super-strong clear
statement rule in its place, see text accompanying notes 144-154.
131. See text accompanying notes 66-70.
132. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
133. Id. at 242 (emphasis added).
134. Id., quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 547
(1985) (Powell dissenting).
135. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 243 (emphasis added).
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of an unusually strong clear statement frustrated congressional intent
and was designed simply "to keep the disfavored suits out of the federal
courts" based on "a fundamental policy decision, vaguely attributed to
the Framers of Article III or the Eleventh Amendment, that the federal
courts ought not to hear suits brought by individuals against States."'1 36
Since Atascadero, the Court has stuck with this super-strong clear
statement rule concerning congressional abrogation of Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity and has applied a similarly strict approach to judging
whether a state itself has waived its Eleventh Amendment rights.1
3 7
Among the odd consequences of this approach are at least two worth
noting. First, the process has played a kind of "bait and switch" trick
on Congress, because older federal statutes that would have effected an
abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity if judged under the less
rigid canon of the era of their enactment are now found lacking in suffi-
cient textual clarity.3 8 Second, the canon has resulted in at least a par-
tial realignment of the traditional conceptualization of the relationship
among the federal government, the states, and Indian tribes. In Blatch-
ford v. Native Village of Noatak,'3 9 the Eleventh Amendment canon
trumped the longstanding canons favoring broad interpretation of fed-
eral statutes benefiting Indian tribes, as the super-strong rule was in-
voked to defeat a tribe's effort to rely upon a federal jurisdictional
statute to sue a state in federal court. Indeed, as the dissent pointed
out, the trumping was so complete that the majority opinion failed even
to note that the Indian law canons exist.
40
The Court has divided sharply on whether congressional power ex-
ists under the commerce clause to abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity,' 4 ' and recent changes in the composition of the
Court may result in a holding that the commerce power lacks this com-
ponent. Nonetheless, it seems clear that Congress has this power when
enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment. 142 Thus, the current state of the
136. Id. at 254 (Brennan dissenting).
137. For cases finding no congressional abrogation of state immunity because statutory lan-
guage subjecting states to liability (and sometimes suit) was not "clear" enough, see Hoffman v.
Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96 (1989); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223
(1989); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). On state waivers under Atas-
cadero, see Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299 (1990) (finding a state
waiver).
138. See text accompanying notes 211-216.
139. 111 S. Ct. 2578 (1991).
140. See id. at 2587-90 (Blackmun dissenting).
141. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion of Brennan,
concluding that the commerce clause power includes the authority to abrogate Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity).
142. Removing Congress's Fourteenth Amendment authority to abrogate Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity would require overruling Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), which the
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law fits our pattern well-judicial restraint at the constitutional level,
judicial activism at the interpretive level-and it is unlikely to change
dramatically in the near future.
3. Super-Strong Rule Against Congressional Regulation of Core
State Functions
Much ink has been spilled,'4" including some of our own,"" examin-
ing the Burger Court's effort, by a 5-4 vote in National League of Cities
v. Usery,14 5 to provide states with a constitutional immunity against
federal regulation of core state functions, and the Court's eventual over-
ruling of National League of Cities in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropol-
itan Transit Authority,'46 another 5-4 case. Recently, the Rehnquist
Court seems to have revived National League of Cities, at least as a
new super-strong rule of statutory interpretation.
In Gregory v. Ashcroft, 47 the question was whether the proscrip-
tion against mandatory retirement provided by the federal Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act 4s (ADEA) prevented a state from
requiring its judges to retire by age seventy. The outcome turned on
whether a judge was an "employee" for purposes of the statute. Elected
state judges clearly came within an exception to the definition of "em-
ployee" for elected officials; appointed state judges also arguably came
within a different exception, one for "appointee[s] on the policymaking
level.' 49 We did not expect this to be a difficult case: in our view, the
admitted ambiguity of the "policymaker" exception should have been
resolved through well-established canons and conventional statutory in-
Court seems unlikely to do. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1989) (plurality
opinion of Brennan) (citing recent cases reaffirming Fitzpatrick).
143. See, for example, Martha A. Field, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author-
ity: The Demise of a Misguided Doctrine, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 84 (1985); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From
Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 S. Ct. Rev. 341; Mar-
tin H. Redish and Karen L. Drizin, Constitutional Federalism & Judicial Review: The Role of
Textual Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 38-39 (1987); Bernard Schwartz, National League of Cities
Again-R.LP. or a Ghost That Still Walks?, 54 Fordham L. Rev. 141 (1985); William W. Van
Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1709 (1985).
144. See Philip P. Frickey, A Further Comment on Stare Decisis and the Overruling of Na-
tional League of Cities, 2 Const. Comm. 341 (1985); Philip P. Frickey, Stare Decisis in Constitu-
tional Cases: Reconsidering National League of Cities, 2 Const. Comm. 123 (1985).
145. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
146. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
147. 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991).
148. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967),
codified as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988).
149. The exceptions were for "any person elected to public office in any State or political
subdivision. . ., or any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an
appointee on the policymaking level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the
constitutional or legal powers of the office." 29 U.S.C. § 630(f)(1988).
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terpretive approaches, and appointed judges should fall outside the
ADEA and be subject to state rules about retirement. 150
In Gregory, Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court agreed with
our outcome, but reached it in a far more dramatic manner. Rather
than relying upon conventional interpretive methods and canons, she
created a new super-strong clear statement rule for federal regulation of
at least some state functions. "[I]nasmuch as this Court in Garcia has
left primarily to the political process the protection of the States
against intrusive exercises of Congress's Commerce Clause powers, we
must be absolutely certain that Congress intended such an exercise." 15'
To support this new rule, Justice O'Connor referred to the policies of
federalism and the super-strong clear statement rule enforcing federal-
ism-based values in the Eleventh Amendment cases. 52 She also stated
that the "responsibility" of the people of the states to determine the
qualifications of their highest officers is, under the Tenth Amendment
and the guarantee clause, of core constitutional significance.15 3 The
forcefulness of this rhetoric of federalism in Gregory is exemplified by
Justice O'Connor's statement, remarkable to our eyes, that Congress's
authority under the supremacy clause to preempt state law "in areas
traditionally regulated by the States" is "an extraordinary power in a
federalist system" that "we must assume Congress does not exercise
lightly." 5 4
The supremacy clause is an exception to our basic system of feder-
alism, rather than a foundational premise upon which the Constitution
replaced the Articles of Confederation? The guarantee clause goes be-
yond its words-which just say that the United States shall ensure that
state governments are republican in form-to provide states with ca-
nonical interpretive protection against all but absolutely clear federal
regulation of at least some state functions? That same guarantee clause
that has been nonjusticiable for at least 140 years, if not forever? 155
Gregory is a breathtaking example of the Rehnquist Court's transfor-
150. See Philip P. Frickey, Lawnet: The Case of the Missing (Tenth) Amendment, 75 Minn.
L. Rev. 755 (1991). It is there argued that, although the plain meaning of the policymaker excep-
tion may support limiting it to executive branch officials, the sharp distinction between elected
judges (who are exempted from the statute) and appointed judges (who would be protected) that
would result cannot be defended in light of overall statutory purpose, the canon of avoiding absurd
results, the canon of avoiding serious constitutional issues (concerning the irrationality of the pur-
ported distinction and, even post-Garcia, the extreme intrusion upon core state functions), and a
policy of resolving genuine federal statutory ambiguity to avoid encroachment upon state
processes.
151. Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2403 (emphasis added).
152. See id. at 2400-01.
153. Id. at 2402.
154. Id. at 2400.
155. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 Howard) 1 (1849).
[Vol. 45:593
CLEAR STATEMENT RULES
mation from constitutional to interpretive activism on questions of
federalism.
4. Presumption Against Statutory Regulation of Intergovernmental
Taxation
Notwithstanding early suggestions that intergovernmental taxation
is strongly disfavored under the Constitution, 156 the Court in this cen-
tury has interpreted the Constitution to permit a wide variety of federal
taxes that burden the states15 7 and state taxes that burden the federal
government,158 so long as the taxes in question do not discriminate
against national or state sovereigns, their obligations, or their employ-
ees. Like the federalism areas discussed above, intergovernmental im-
munity is no longer actively enforced by the Supreme Court as a matter
of constitutional law. But a recent case suggests that the Court will de-
ploy the precepts of its constitutional cases as a presumption for inter-
preting federal statutes touching upon intergovernmental tax
immunity.
The issue in Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury'" was
whether Michigan could exempt state employees from taxation of re-
tirement benefits, while subjecting all other retired employees, includ-
ing federal employees, to such taxes. A federal statute consents to state
taxation of federal employees so long as it "does not discriminate
against the officer or employee because of the source of the pay or com-
pensation."'160 In Davis, of course, there was no state discrimination
against federal retirees (they were treated exactly like retirees of pri-
vate employers), but there was discrimination in favor of state retirees
(they received a tax break unavailable to either private or federal retir-
ees). Nonetheless, the Court was confident that the federal statute in-
validated the unequal tax treatment, because the Court interpreted the
federal statute as a mere codification of federal constitutional law,'
6'
even though the federal statute was actually enacted before the Su-
preme Court decisions that modernized intergovernmental tax immu-
nity. The Court then evaluated the Michigan tax plan under its
constitutional precedents.
156. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheaton) 315 (1819), especially as interpreted
in The Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wallace) 113, 124-28 (1870); Dobbins v. Commissioners of
Erie County, 41 U.S. 435 (1842).
157. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 525 (1988).
158. Graves v. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
159. 489 U.S. 803 (1989).
160. 4 U.S.C. § 111 (1988).




Davis at least stands for the presumption that federal statutes
touching upon intergovernmental tax immunity are "coextensive with
the prohibition against discriminatory taxes embodied in the modern
constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity.' 1 62 The de-
cision might also be read as one in which the Court avoided difficult
constitutional questions by interpreting the statute's consent to state
taxation narrowly. And Davis in the future might even be read to sup-
port a clear statement rule that the Court will interpret federal statutes
in line with constitutional precedents unless the statutory text disavows
those precedents.
163
5. Presumption Against Applicability of Federal Statutes to State
and Local Political Processes
The federalism values at work in Pennhurst, the Eleventh Amend-
ment cases, and Gregory have strongly influenced the role of the rule of
lenity in recent federal criminal cases involving state politics. Although
these cases do not articulate a clear statement rule expressly, their re-
sults are perhaps best understood as creating a rebuttable presumption
that federal criminal statutes will not be used as a weapon to interfere
in local politics.
In McNally v. United States,6 4 the Court held that the federal
mail fraud statute' 65 did not reach a scheme under which a state official
and powerful persons in the state's dominant political party conspired
to assign state insurance business to certain agencies that were required
to "kick back" part of the insurance premiums. No monetary loss to the
state was shown, and the federal prosecutor's theory of the case was
that the conspirators had defrauded the state citizenry and the state
government of their intangible right to honest government. Even
though the mail fraud statute by its terms reached "any scheme or arti-
fice to defraud,"' 66 and even though applying it to these facts would
have been consistent with the background of the statute and the inter-
162. Davis, 489 U.S. at 813. See also Memphis Bank & Trust Co., 459 U.S. at 396-97 (adopt-
ing a similar rule).
163. Note, however, that Davis itself carefully examined the legislative history of Section
111. See 489 U.S. at 811-813.
164. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
165. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
166. The statute subjected to criminal penalty:
Whoever, having devised or intended to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for ob-
taining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or pur-
poses, . . . for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, [uses




pretations of it in the lower courts,'6 7 Justice White's majority opinion
concluded that the statute protected only against fraud involving
money or property rights. Justice White relied on a strong version of
the rule of lenity, under which the harsher of two readings of a criminal
statute should be chosen "only when Congress has spoken in clear and
definite language.' 6 8 He bolstered the application of the rule by noting
that its use avoided involving "the Federal Government in setting stan-
dards of disclosure and good government for local and state officials,"'' 69
and he seemed dubious that federal criminal law should be interpreted
to reach the acts of state officials and their associates that are not
clearly in violation of the state's own laws. 17 0 Justice Stevens, in dissent,
complained that the Court was using the rule of lenity to come to the
aid of "the most sophisticated practitioners of the art of government"
who ought to have known that their acts would be deemed unlawful
based on precedents in the lower federal courts.'
7 1
More recently, in McCormick v. United States7 2 the Court enter-
tained another federal criminal case containing colorful facts about the
realities of state politics. During his reelection campaign, a state legisla-
tor who had sponsored and secured passage of legislation important to
an interest group in the past and had promised to do so again in the
future informed the group's lobbyist that his campaign expenses were
high and that "he had heard nothing" from the group-comments that
sounded like a threat to abandon his promise to carry future legislation
for the group unless a payment were received. The lobbyist then deliv-
ered a series of cash payments to the legislator, who neither listed them
as campaign contributions nor reported them as income for federal tax
purposes. Nor did the lobbyist record the payments as campaign contri-
butions. The legislator was reelected and did sponsor more legislation
for the group. Justice White for the majority in McCormick held that
this conduct was not "extortion," as defined in the Hobbs Act.' 73 Jus-
tice White interpreted the statute narrowly to require solid proof of an
explicit quid pro quo, as opposed to mere anticipation of favorable fu-
ture legislative action. A major reason to cabin the Hobbs Act was a
fear of intruding into ordinary state political processes.'
7 4
167. See McNally, 483 U.S. at 362-77 (Stevens dissenting.)
168. Id. at 359-60.
169. Id. at 360.
170. See id. at 361 n.9.
171. See id. at 375 n.9 (Stevens dissenting).
172. 111 S. Ct. 1807 (1991).
173. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988) (defining extortion as "the obtaining of property from another,
with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under
color of official right").
174. See McCormick, 111 S. Ct. at 1816.
1992]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Although the most dramatic examples of this nascent presumption
involve federal criminal statutes, the presumption has figured promi-
nently in at least one Sherman Act case, City of Columbia v. Omni Out-
door Advertising, Inc.175 Although the Court did not explicitly
formulate a clear statement rule, it reasoned that the federal antitrust
laws need to steer clear of local politics and used that precept as the
basis for its holding that public-private conspiracies to ruin competition
are immune from Sherman Act liability.
6. Federalism as an Eroding Agent: The Potential Demise of the
Canon Disfavoring State Regulation in Indian Country
The federalism values at work in Pennhurst, the Eleventh Amend-
ment cases, Gregory, and the federal criminal cases also may have dra-
matically deflated the longstanding canon presuming that states have
no regulatory role in Indian country. Federal Indian law is so murky
that any conclusion about it is difficult and so technical that any full
discussion of it would be diverting, but the development is worth noting
in passing because it fits our thesis well.
In Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico,176 the Court upheld ap-
plication of a state oil and gas severance tax upon a non-Indian com-
pany under contract with a tribe to extract oil and gas in Indian
country, even though the practical incidence of the tax probably fell
largely upon the tribe.177 Justice Stevens' majority opinion acknowl-
edged only grudgingly the existence of the Indian law canons' 78 and
then undertook a two-step process to defeat immunity from state taxa-
tion. Unlike earlier cases, 179 Justice Stevens essentially equated a con-
tractor doing business with a tribe to a contractor doing business with
the federal government. Since federal contractors are presumptively
subject to state taxation, so too are tribal contractors. More fundamen-
tally, in contrast to most conventional understandings of federal Indian
175. 111 S. Ct. 1344 (1991). See also Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 111 S. Ct. 1842, 1849
(1991) (Scalia dissenting) (adopting a presumption against a broad reading of the Sherman Act's
interstate commerce component).
176. 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
177. Our discussion of Cotton Petroleum is based on Frickey, 78 Cal. L. Rev. at 1172-73,
1187-89,-1197, 1202, 1221, 1227-28, 1237 (cited in note 71). Rather than burden this Article with
the technicalities of federal Indian law in general and Cotton Petroleum in particular, we ask
interested readers to consult that source.
178. The Court noted that "although state interests must be given weight and courts should
be careful not to make legislative decisions in the absence of congressional action, ambiguities in
federal law are, as a rule, resolved in favor of tribal independence." Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at
177.




law flowing from the work of Chief Justice Marshall,8 0 Justice Stevens
seemed to view Indian reservations as presumptively within the juris-
diction of state legislative power. 181 If this approach to federal Indian
law stands, the field has been turned on its head.
Again, strong conceptions of federalism have taken root at the in-
terpretive level, this time potentially demolishing a longstanding canon
of interpretation that cuts against state power. Again, this is occurring
in an area in which the Court will not impose solutions through consti-
tutional review. Not coincidentally, we also believe, the potential demo-
lition of the Indian law canon was accomplished by equating tribes with
the federal government, and then using the interpretive process to limit
federal power to regulate within what the Court perceives to be the
state's domain.
III. CONCERNS ABOUT THE SUPREME COURT'S NEW CANONICAL
JURISPRUDENCE
A theme that emerges from Part II is the following: The current
Court does not see itself to be as constitutionally activist as prior
Courts have been; it is loathe to strike down federal statutes that argua-
bly violate precepts of separation of powers, federalism, international
comity, freedom of speech and religion, nondiscrimination on the basis
of race and gender, and so forth. Yet the current Court is unusually
activist in the way it does statutory interpretation, creating clear state-
ment rules and super-clear statement rules as means by which the
Court can read constitutional values into statutes, albeit with the possi-
bility of congressional override. The question is: Is the Court's posture
normatively desirable?
180. See text at notes 73-74.
181. The language in Cotton Petroleum is so inconsistent with Chief Justice Marshall's con-
clusions that it deserves quoting. "States and tribes have concurrent jurisdiction over the same
territory," Cotton Petroleum states, apparently as a general proposition of law. 490 U.S. at 192.
Moreover, turning to matters of taxation in particular:
[A] multiple taxation issue may arise when more than one State attempts to tax the same
activity. If a unitary business derives income from several States, each State may only tax the
portion of that income that is attributable to activity within its borders. Thus, in such a case,
an apportionment formula is necessary in order to identify the scope of the taxpayer's busi-
ness that is within the taxing jurisdiction of each State. In this case, however, all of Cotton's
leases are located entirely within the borders of the State of New Mexico and also within the
borders of the Jicarilla Apache Reservation. Indeed, they are also within the borders of the
United States. There are, therefore, three different governmental entities, each of which has
taxing jurisdiction over all of the non-Indian wells. The federal sovereign has the undoubted
power to prohibit taxation of the Tribe's lessees by the Tribe, by the State, or by both, but
since it has not exercised that power, concurrent taxing jurisdiction over all of Cotton's on-
reservation leases exists. Unless and until Congress provides otherwise, each of the other two
sovereigns has taxing jurisdiction over all of Cotton's leases.
Id. at 188-189 (citations and footnote omitted).
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There is no clear answer to the inquiry we have just posed, because
the Court is still moving tentatively, rather than definitively, toward
articulation of new or revised clear statement rules and their applica-
tion. In this Part we will propound what we consider the best available
theory for what the Court seems to be doing, with a focus on the new
super-clear statement rules grounded upon separation of powers and
federalism, and suggest concerns with what we view as the Court's di-
rection in this arena.
We begin our inquiry with a recognition that the Court has not
thoroughly thought through its use of the canons in doing statutory in-
terpretation and that much of what the Court has been doing may have
been unconscious. Nonetheless, we believe there is an underlying theory
embedded in what we see the Rehnquist Court doing with the canons.
The theory is not shared by all the justices and perhaps is not unam-
biguously accepted by more than one or two. But the following theory
provides the most sympathetic account for understanding the Court's
activity. 82
In a representative democracy such as ours, most important politi-
cal decisions should be made by the political branches, primarily Con-
gress and secondarily the Executive.8 3 Judicial review in a democracy is
exceptional and should be deployed by unelected judges only when
there is a clear inconsistency between a statute or regulation and the
Constitution.1 4 Indeed, we have learned over time that certain consti-
tutional values-most notably the structural rather than individual
rights values-are either unenforceable by the Court because they in-
volve essentially nonjusticiable political questions or will be under-
enforced by the Court.'"5  These unenforced or underenforced
constitutional norms include the nondelegation doctrine,186 federalism
182. The following account is drawn liberally from William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Tex-
tualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621 (1990); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212 (1978); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice
Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 1597 (1991).
183. Article I vests the primary lawmaking power in Congress, though the President has a
formal role through the veto of Article I, Section 7, and an important informal role through execu-
tive and agency rulemaking. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984). Also, the Executive may have a primary lawmaking role in some foreign affairs
matters. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
184. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitu-
tional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1893).
185. For the latter idea, see Sager, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212. See also Stephen F. Ross, Legisla-
tive Enforcement of Equal Protection, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 311 (1987).
186. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-79 (1989) (finding the nondelegation
doctrine too vague to enforce as constitutional law but suggesting it might be a useful precept of
statutory interpretation); id. at 415-16 (Scalia dissenting generally, but concurring on this issue).
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limitations on the national government, 187 and separation of powers."'
While a Court that seeks to avoid antidemocratic constitutional ac-
tivism might refuse to invalidate federal statutes because of their in-
fringement of these constitutional norms, such a Court might also seek
other ways to protect those norms. One way to articulate and protect
underenforced constitutional norms is through interpretive presump-
tions, clear statement rules, and super-strong clear statement
rules-canons of statutory construction.189 The canons, especially the
"tough" ones, can protect important constitutional values against acci-
dental or undeliberated infringement by requiring Congress to address
those values specifically and directly. Protecting underenforced consti-
tutional norms through super-strong clear statement rules makes sense:
it is not ultimately undemocratic, because Congress can override the
norm through a statutory clear statement; such rules still provide sig-
nificant protection for constitutional norms, because they raise the costs
of statutory provisions invading such norms; and ultimately such rules
may even be democracy-enhancing by focusing the political process on
the values enshrined in the Constitution.
This theory provides what we believe to be the best account of
what the Rehnquist Court believes itself to be doing with the canons
today. The canons are not necessary to protect individual liberties, such
as those enshrined in the First Amendment, because those constitu-
tional protections are not underenforced to the same extent that the
structural protections are. Hence cases like Rust v. Sullivan. The ca-
nons are necessary to assure that the political branches make the most
important policy choices in our democracy. Hence Chevron. And the
canons are critically important to give meaning to underenforced con-
stitutional norms, especially federalism norms. Hence Pennhurst, Atas-
cadero, Gregory, and Cotton Petroleum. Hence, also, Omni Outdoor
187. The commerce clause has emerged as a virtually limitless authorization for national reg-
ulatory legislation. See, for example, Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
More generally, Article I, § 8 is either unenforceable or (at the very least) underenforced as a
limitation on national power. The Court has held that the Tenth Amendment is unenforceable as a
limitation on Congress's power to regulate the states directly. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Auth'y, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
188. Although the Court in Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), seemed poised to enforce
separation of powers norms against an overreaching Congress, it dramatically retreated (over im-
passioned dissents by Justice Scalia) in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), and Mistretta, 488
U.S. 361, upholding unconventional arrangements. Consider also the Court's highly deferential
view of the President's exercise of arguably unconstitutional foreign affairs powers in Dames &
Moore. These cases suggest that separation of powers norms are underenforced, but not completely
unenforced, by the Court.
189. This is not the only way, of course. Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to
Constitutional Interpretation, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 585 (1975), argues that Congress is in the best
position to protect underenforced norms.
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Advertising, McNally, and McCormick.9 '
Notwithstanding the attractiveness of this theory for the Court's
use of the canons, there are several caveats we shall raise. They are
concerns that (1) the Court's actual practice is incoherent with its theo-
retical underpinning in the concept of underenforced constitutional
norms; (2) the Court's new canons are countermajoritarian and unnec-
essarily burden the legislative process; and (3) the Court's new canons
reflect substantive biases that are hard to defend normatively.
A. Coherence Concerns
Although we believe that the theory outlined above is the most so-
phisticated and sympathetic theory that explains what the Court thinks
it is doing when it creates and applies these new canons, especially the
new super-strong clear statement rules, we fear that the Court's prac-
tide is ultimately incoherent with the logical consequences of the theory
and with the Court's own recent precedents. In other words, even our
best theory for the Court's practice falls apart upon further
examination.
An initial difficulty is that the Court's actual practice is not consis-
tent with the theory of underenforced constitutional norms. The lead-
ing theorists of underenforced constitutional norms-Lawrence Sager,
Paul Brest, Stephen Ross-emphasize that constitutional provisions
protecting individual liberties such as free speech and equal protection
are underenforced because of the Court's concern about the counterma-
joritarian difficulties in striking down statutes enacted by popularly
elected legislatures. 191 Their insight suggests the value of a clear state-
ment rule to avoid constitutional difficulties, as articulated in NLRB v.
Catholic Bishop of Chicago.92 Yet the current Court does not enforce
that clear statement rule vigorously;'9 3 it has instead created super-
strong clear statement rules protecting structural norms. Thus, the the-
ory of underenforced constitutional norms supports Justice O'Connor's
minority view in Rust v. Sullivan rather than the majority's view, in
which a novel agency interpretation overrode significant but under-
enforced constitutional values of free speech and gender equality.
190. Under our theory, the Court would be most aggressive in enforcing the rule of lenity
when a federal criminal prosecution invaded important state concerns. Both McNally and McCor-
mick were federal prosecutions of state officials.
191. See Brest, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 585 (cited in note 189); Ross, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 311 (cited in
note 185); Sager, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212 (cited in note 182).
192. 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979).
193. Except to protect underenforced structural norms. See Public Citizen v. Department of
Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989) (applying the rule to interpret a statute to protect the President's
freedom of consultation concerning judicial appointments).
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The Court's probable response to this problem is that structural
constitutional norms are more underenforced than individual rights
norms are and, hence, require greater protection through something like
super-strong clear statement rules. There is much to be said for this
response, for the nondelegation doctrine and federalism are almost
never enforced through constitutional invalidation of federal statutes,
and separation of powers limits are rarely enforced. While the equal
protection clause and the First Amendment might be underenforced,
they seem to have more enforceable bite than the unenforced structural
protections. Ergo the Court enforces the former through direct judicial
review (constitutional law) and the latter through clear statement rules
(quasi-constitutional law).
This response becomes problematic when one considers the stated
reasons for unenforcement of structural constitutional norms. In Gar-
cia, the Court announced that federalism-based limits on national
power are unenforceable against Congress because the Court has been
unable to develop "principled constitutional limitations" from the
Tenth Amendment and the commerce clause and because "the princi-
pal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the
federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself."'19
We shall focus on these federalism norms, but note that similar reason-
ing underlies the Court's failure to enforce the nondelegation doctrine
and separation of powers.
19 5
These reasons for unenforcement of federalism norms through judi-
cial review are equally valid arguments for the unenforcement of feder-
alism norms through statutory interpretation. On the one hand, if the
Court fails to enforce structural constitutional norms because the Con-
stitution provides little guidance as to their content in specific cases,
how does the Court expect to come up with clear statement rules that
are any more principled? The Court's decision in Gregory v. Ashcroft is
not a very impressive effort in this regard. Garcia overruled National
League of Cities largely because neither the lower courts nor the Su-
194. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550.
195. Thus, in Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371-379, the Court reasoned that the nondelegation doc-
trine provides insufficient standards for the Court to invalidate federal legislation. An equally obvi-
ous reason for not enforcing the doctrine is that the political system can be expected to self-
regulate excessive delegation. To wit: Congress, the offender in cases of excessive delegation, has
good reason to avoid or correct the problem, because excessive delegation diminishes congressional
power.
Similar reasons apply in separation of powers cases. In foreign affairs cases in particular, the
Court often expresses concern that it is not competent to judge executive action, and that the
Constitution provides the Court with insufficient guidance. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996,
998-1006 (1979) (plurality opinion). Moreover, in cases of Congress-versus-President conflict, each
branch has means to protect itself against encroachment.
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preme Court ever developed workable standards for implementing a
constitutional immunity from federal regulation of states qua states. 19
Gregory threatens to return to the same quandary-at the interpretive
rather than the constitutional level-of defining whether the subjects of
regulation are "indisputably attributes of state sovereignty," whether
state compliance with federal regulation "directly impairs" the state's
ability "to structure integral operations in areas of traditional govern-
mental functions," and whether the federal interest in regulation out-
weighs the state interest in autonomy. 197 Gregory itself provides little
guidance on when to apply the super-strong canon, referring at one
time or another to "areas traditionally regulated by the States,"'98 state
decisions of "the most fundamental sort for a sovereign entity,' 99 "au-
thority that lies at 'the heart of representative government,' ",200 and in-
trusion on "state governmental functions."' 20 ' This list would seem to
run the gamut from everything within the traditional police power to
state operation of all its governmental processes to state methods of
selecting high officials.
At a minimum, one would expect Gregory to immunize state
processes of selecting judges from all but crystal-clear federal regula-
tion. One would be wrong. The .same day the Court handed down Greg-
ory, it decided Chisom v. Roemer.2 °2 Chisom held that Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act,203 which prohibits state electoral processes that re-
sult in the dilution of the voting strength of a racial minority, applies to
the election of state judges. Justice Stevens' majority opinion ap-
proached the interpretive question quite conventionally, relying heavily
upon the legislative history and purpose of the statute. The majority
never even considered whether any super-strong clear statement rule
about federal regulation applied; indeed, it did not even cite Gregory.
In dissent, Justice Scalia argued that subsection (b) of Section 2, which
refers to the right of minorities to "participate in the political process
and to elect representatives of their choice," 204 demonstrates that the
statute does not reach judges, for they do not fit the ordinary definition
of "representatives. ' 20 5 Justice Scalia noted the potential applicability
196. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 537-47.
197. See id. at 537, (reciting the test of Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Ass'n, 452
U.S. 264 (1981), that implemented National League of Cities).
198. Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2400.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 2402.
201. Id. at 2406.
202. 111 S. Ct. 2354 (1991).
203. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988).
204. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)(1988) (emphasis added).
205. See Chisom, 111 S. Ct. at 2370-72 (Scalia dissenting). The majority responded that
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of the super-strong clear statement rule of Gregory, but acknowledged
that perhaps Gregory was distinguishable.0 8 Justice O'Connor was a
member of the (silent) majority in Chisom, and thus we have no guid-
ance from the author of Gregory about why it was inapplicable in the
voting rights case.207
On the other hand, if the Court fails to enforce structural constitu-
tional norms because it has concluded that the Constitution leaves en-
forcement of those norms to the political process (Congress and the
President), then isn't the Court's creation of super-strong clear state-
ment rules a backdoor way for the Court to take these issues back from
the political process? Again, Garcia was premised in part upon the ar-
gument that it is not necessary for the Court to protect federalism val-
ues through judicial review, because the structure of the national
"representatives" means "the winners of representative, popular elections." Id. at 2366.
206. Justice Scalia wrote:
[11n Gregory interpreting the statute to include judges would have made them the only high-
level state officials affected, whereas here the question is whether judges were excluded from a
general imposition upon state elections that unquestionably exists; and in Gregory it was
questionable whether Congress was invoking its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment
(rather than merely the Commerce Clause), whereas here it is obvious. Perhaps those factors
suffice to distinguish the two cases. Moreover, we tacitly rejected a "plain statement" rule as
applied to the unamended § 2 in City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 ... (1980),
though arguably that was before the rule had developed the significance it currently has. I am
content to dispense with the "plain statement" rule in the present case,. . . but it says some-
thing about the Court's approach to today's decision that the possibility of applying that rule
never crossed its mind.
Id. at 2373.
A few brief comments are in order. Gregory may (and perhaps should) end up as simply a
commerce clause precedent, but the majority opinion stated, arguably in dictum, that "this Court
has never held that the [Fourteenth] Amendment may be applied in complete disregard for a
State's constitutional powers." Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2405. Gregory also alluded to another feder-
alism aspect of Pennhurst (discussed in other respects at text accompanying notes 118-130), in
which the Court adopted a presumption that Congress is not exercising its Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement powers in regulating states unless there is a clear statement to the contrary. See 111
S. Ct. at 2405-06. The Court in Gregory thought that "[t]he Pennhurst rule looks much like the
plain statement rule we apply today," and accordingly interpreted statutory ambiguity against
congressional power "regardless of whether Congress acted pursuant to its Commerce Clause pow-
ers or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 2406. (By the way, contrary to Justice Scalia's
comment, the Voting Rights Act was adopted pursuant to the Fifteenth Amendment, but that does
not change the analysis.)
For more conflict over the meaning of Gregory, compare Hilton v. South Carolina Public Rail-
ways Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 560, 566 (1991) (holding that Gregory is a rule of statutory interpretation
rather than constitutional law) with id. at 568-69 (O'Connor dissenting) (finding that Gregory is
rooted in the Constitution).
207. One percipient commentator, our colleague Dan Farber, has suggested that the real dis-
tinction between Chisom and Gregory is that in the former Congress was enforcing the guarantee
clause by ensuring a more republican form of state government, while in the latter it was arguably
interfering with the exercise of republican rights by the state citizenry in deciding what the terms
of office for their high state officials should be. See Daniel A. Farber, The Return of Federalism,
Trial Magazine 63-65 (Oct. 1991).
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government protects states' interests and their sovereign integrity. If
state sovereignty interests are well-protected by the structures of the
national political process, what need is there for the Court to add extra
protections by means of super-strong clear statement rules, such as
those suggested in Pennhurst, Atascadero, Cotton Petroleum, and
Gregory?
One might read these cases as a backdoor curtailment of Garcia.°s
Such a reading only renders the cases more deeply problematic, how-
ever. Although the Court's flip-flops in this area are notorious,20 9 any
effort to overrule an important and recently decided precedent such as
Garcia would have to mount a persuasive rebuttal against the reasoning
in that opinion. We are doubtful that the Court is capable of writing
such a rebuttal, and we believe there is much to be said for the reason-
ing in Garcia. Just as Garcia suggested, the Court never developed clear
standards for applying National League of Cities. And, as Garcia also
suggested, the states are particularly well represented in the national
political process.210 In our view, the Court has a responsibility to answer
these arguments if it intends to reverse (even if only in part) the Garcia
rule through backdoor constitutional lawmaking.
B. Countermajoritarian Concerns
The coherence concerns developed above raise the related concern
that the Court's new canons represent a form of judicial activism that is
particularly questionable because it is backdoor. In other words, by en-
forcing federalism-based values through statutory interpretation, the
Court has not avoided the countermajoritarian difficulty-indeed, the
Court may well have only deepened it by engaging in under-the-table
constitutional lawmaking. A possible response to this concern is that
208. For example, Justice O'Connor, the author of Gregory, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, the
author of Pennhurst, wrote emotional dissenting opinions in Garcia.
209. Namely, Garcia (in 1985) overruled National League of Cities (decided in 1976), which
itself had overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968). Thus, this is not an area of law in
which stare decisis has been an important constraint upon the Court. Indeed, a cynic might sug-
gest that the issue of state constitutional immunity from federal regulation runs in something like
an eight-year cycle.
210. Like Garcia itself, we do not rely on the original constitutional framework, in which the
states elected Senators and constituted the Electoral College to elect the President, because those
formalities have been overtaken by time. But functionally the interests of the states remain well
represented. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 Yale L. J. 331, 348-49, 351-52 (1991) (observing that states are unusually successful
in obtaining congressional overrides of Supreme Court decisions cutting against their interests);
Carol Lee, The Political Safeguards of Federalism? Congressional Responses to Supreme Court
Decisions on State and Local Liability, 20 Urban Law. 301 (1988). For example, state and local
governments quickly obtained a statutory override of Garcia itself in the Fair Labor Standards
Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-150, 99 Stat. 787 (1985), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1988).
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the Court's new super-strong clear statement rules are essentially a con-
stitutional way-station, a compromise position based upon the classic
legal process concept of "due process of lawmaking."
The response would run as follows: Every time the Court interprets
a federal statute or the Constitution, it is potentially imposing its own
preferences on the product of the popularly elected legislature. Yet
every time the Court engages in the political activity of interpretation,
Congress can override the Court. Supermajorities in Congress, plus the
consent of the states, are usually required to override the Court's con-
stitutional interpretations limiting federal power, but only normal ma-
jorities are required to override the Court's restrictive statutory
interpretations. Relatively speaking, therefore, the Court's implementa-
tion of federalism-based values through super-strong clear statement
rules (quasi-constitutional law) is less countermajoritarian than its im-
plementation of those values through direct judicial review (constitu-
tional law).
Although this response makes a lot of sense, it is beclouded with
ambiguities and difficulties. To begin with, the response does not pro-
vide any firm basis for believing that the aggregate amount of counter-
majoritarian judicial activity would be any less under the Court's
backdoor, quasi-constitutional activism than under a regime of open
constitutional activism. Indeed, there is good reason to think that the
Court's super-strong clear statement rules might provide the Court with
a cover for a great deal more countermajoritarian activism, overall, than
would open invalidation through judicial review. For example, if the
Court overruled Garcia and sought once again to enforce the Tenth
Amendment, it would face a lot of political heat. Such political heat
may have contributed to the Court's failure to deploy National League
of Cities to strike down any federal law after 1976. Because the Court
sees itself as using up political capital every time it invalidates a stat-
ute, it thinks twice about exercising judicial review. To the extent the
Court does not see itself as being "on the spot" when it interprets stat-
utes, it may believe it has more freedom to interpret statutes to thwart
legislative expectations than it does to strike them down. In that event,
the Court's overall level of activism may be much higher under a Greg-
ory super-strong clear statement rule than under a National League of
Cities constitutional rule.
Additionally, one should be careful not to understate the counter-
majoritarian nature of super-strong clear statement rules. Presumptions
of statutory interpretation are sometimes countermajoritarian, because
they are often rooted in values of special interest to the judiciary, such
as the availability of judicial review. But such presumptions can be re-
butted through reference to the circumstances of the legislation, includ-
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ing legislative history. It is harder to rebut clear statement rules,
because they require rebuttal on the face of, or by implication from, the
statute itself. Thus, even ordinary clear statement rules are particularly
countermajoritarian, because they permit the Court to override proba-
ble congressional preferences in statutory interpretation in favor of
norms and values favored by the Court.
Recall Aramco, in which the Court interpreted the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 to be inapplicable to American employees who work overseas
for American companies. Given the sweeping language of the Act and
the equally sweeping statements in the legislative history concerning
the eradication of all manifestations of job discrimination, it seems very
probable that Congress in 1964 would have expected the statute to ap-
ply in Aramco-type situations (which are much more common now than
they were in 1964). As the dissent argued, the old presumption against
extraterritorial application of U.S. law could have been rebutted by
such evidence. The Court escaped from these arguments by reconceptu-
alizing the presumption as a clear statement rule that could be rebutted
only by textual evidence. This strikes us as strongly counter-
majoritarian.
If presumptions are often countermajoritarian and ordinary clear
statement rules more countermajoritarian, then the Court's new super-
strong clear statement rules are extraordinarily countermajoritarian:
they not only pose the possibility of ignoring legislative expectations,
but they also make it quite hard for Congress to express its expecta-
tions even when it is focusing on the issue. Consider the recent case of
Dellmuth v. Muth.211 The Court in that case applied the Atascadero
super-strong clear statement rule to find that the Education of the
Handicapped Act of 1975 (EHA) did not permit damage suits against
the states. The decision was countermajoritarian, for the text assumed
the viability of such lawsuits, and specific legislative history confirmed
the assumption. 12
But the decision was more than simply countermajoritarian. It sug-
gested a certain judicial haughtiness and uncooperativeness that is
surely inconsistent with the humble due process of lawmaking rationale
for the Court's super-strong clear statement rules. For under the Su-
preme Court's prevailing Eleventh Amendment precedent in 1975,13
when Congress adopted the statute, the jurisdictional language covering
actions against the states plus the specific legislative history were prob-
211. 491 U.S. 223 (1989).
212. 121 Cong. Rec. 246-47 (Jan. 15, 1975) (statement of Sen. Williams, the Senate sponsor).
213. Employees of the Dep't of Public Health & Welfare v. Department of Public Health &
Welfare, Missouri, 411 U.S. 279 (1973) (discussed in text at notes 69-70).
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ably enough to rebut the presumption against congressional abrogation
of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity, and were perhaps even
strong enough to satisfy a traditional clear statement rule. In 1985, of
course, the Court changed its approach to the Atascadero super-strong
clear statement rule.
Given this shift, Congress in 1986 enacted the following statute: "A
State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment. . .from
suit in Federal Court for a violation of [statutes protecting people with
disabilities, including the EHA]. ' ' 214 Congress complained that its intent
in the Rehabilitation Act had been thwarted by Atascadero and over-
rode that decision in a way expected to head off state immunity claims
under other statutes protecting people with disabilities. Yet in
Dellmuth, the Court not only held that the EHA of 1975 failed to abro-
gate state immunity, but cited as evidence the subsequent 1986 statute,
which contained the requisite clear statement but did not apply to the
case in question.115 Congress promptly overrode Dellmuth in 1990.
What is most striking to us is that it took Congress three statutes and
fifteen years to accomplish what Congress probably thought it had done
in 1975. That is extraordinarily countermajoritarian.
As the Dellmuth example illustrates, the countermajoritarian na-
ture of the Court's super-strong clear statement rules is not necessarily
mitigated by the possibility of a congressional override. Even when
Congress thinks it is overriding the Court, the Court has frustrated
Congress's expectations in cases like Dellmuth.1 6 More important, it is
sometimes as difficult to override a Supreme Court statutory decision as
it is to override a constitutional one. Thus, in the current period of di-
vided government, with the President and the Court aligned on issues
of civil rights against the preferences of Congress, an override of a Su-
preme Court statutory decision requires the same supermajorities in
Congress that a constitutional amendment requires. 11 Even when the
President is not opposed to an override, powerful interest
groups-including the ones that won the Supreme Court case-will be,
214. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) (1988).
215. Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 227-32.
216. See Nordic Village, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4163 (Stevens dissenting). Compare Ohio Pub. Em-
ployees Retirement System v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989) (refusing to follow the Conference Com-
mittee directive in interpreting the ADEA) with id. at 182 (Marshall dissenting) (criticizing the
majority for ignoring the Conference Report). Compare also Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642 (1989) (majority opinion) with id. at 661 (Blackmun dissenting).
217. Overriding a statutory decision supported by the President requires two-thirds support
in both chambers of Congress to overcome an actual or threatened presidential veto. U.S. Const.,
Art. I., § 7. This is the same supermajority required for Congress to propose a constitutional
amendment. Id., Art. V. Of course, the latter must then be approved by three-quarters of the
states, a requirement not posed for an override of a statutory decision.
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and the legislative process offers numerous opportunities for deter-
mined minorities to thwart override efforts.
C. Normative Concerns
Notwithstanding concerns that the Court's new super-strong clear
statement rules are not consistently linked to a coherent practice of ju-
dicial review and may in fact be a form of countermajoritarian judicial
activism, the rules might be defended as justifiable activism. Perhaps
the constitutional norms they protect are unusually valuable. Although
the Rehnquist Court does not see itself as an activist Court, at least
some of its decisions have sought to justify its clear statement rules as
normatively desirable. In reading the Rehnquist Court's clear statement
cases, we find three constitutional values that the Court is emphasizing:
Executive rulemaking, federalism, and private ordering.
As we suggest below, the Court's special concern for each of these
values is normatively questionable because the Court's special protec-
tion for each value slights other equally important constitutional values.
But also consider throughout our discussion the way in which the
Rehnquist Court's new clear statement rules reflect an overall constitu-
tional vision that is strikingly old-fashioned:218 Ordering by private
elites is preferred over governmental intrusion; state power is preferred
over national power; and rulemaking by the executive is preferred over
lawmaking by Congress.
1. Preference for Ordering by Private Elites over Governmental
Regulation
One theme that emerges from the Court's recent canonical activity
is the Court's preference for private ordering over governmental regula-
tion, but only when the private ordering is accomplished by traditional
elites. This theme is a saddening one if borne out by the Court's activ-
ity in the 1990s, but it is a theme suggested by the Court's activity in
the 1980s, especially near the end of the decade.
The theme is strongly suggested by the contrast between cases like
Aramco, which transformed the presumption against extraterritorial
application of federal statutes into a clear statement rule, and Rust v.
Sullivan, which refused to apply the rule to avoid difficult constitu-
tional issues to protect the interests of poor and middle-class pregnant
women who might desire abortions. The contrast is all the more striking
218. Note the striking similarity between how we see the Rehnquist Court's overall agenda
and how Professor David Shapiro viewed Justice Rehnquist's personal ideological agenda in the




in that the Court in Rust relied heavily upon the agency position,
thereby rejecting two decades of prior agency practice and legislative
understanding, while the Court in Aramco refused even to discuss the
longstanding agency position which the Court was rejecting. Although
the constitutional values at stake in Rust-a woman's right to an abor-
tion and a doctor's right to counsel her patients-are controversial
within the Court, they strike us as much more worthy of protection
than the pre-New Deal, pre-transnational business value of limited ter-
ritorial effect. Aramco's interest in this value, which gives important
protections to transnational corporations, seems hard to understand.
Our contrast between Aramco and Rust is deepened by considering
the Court's other Title VII decisions in the last few Terms. The pri-
mary observation is that when the interests of employers are threatened
by vigorous enforcement of Title VII, the Court has all but uniformly
cut back on the statute to protect those interests. The most significant
victory for victims of discrimination came in Johnson v. Transporta-
tion Agency,2 1 9 which reaffirmed the Court's prior approval of affirma-
tive action in the workplace. In Johnson, however, both employers and
unions were supportive of affirmative action, which gave them a mecha-
nism to avoid disparate impact lawsuits. Thus, the Court has not regu-
lated affirmative action plans adopted by unions and employers, but
instead expressed its reservations about such plans by making it easier
for employers and unions to defend against disparate impact ("bad
numbers") lawsuits in Wards Cove Packing Company v. Atonio.220
From the perspective of the cynic, at least, the Court seems to have
carefully calibrated its hostility to Title VII plaintiffs, strongly prefer-
ring the interests of women to those of African Americans, even though
the statute itself was enacted mainly out of concern for the economic
inequality of African Americans. Thus, Johnson expanded the Court's
tolerance for affirmative action plans to help female employees as well
as African American ones. And in the same Term that Wards Cove set
back efforts by racial minorities to advance their place in the workforce,
the Court handed down six decisions interpreting Title VII and related
job discrimination statutes. Three of the decisions (including Wards
Cove) seemed targeted against racial minorities in particular.2 21 Two
219. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
220. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
221. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (adopting a narrow view of
Section 1981, which only protects against discrimination by reason of race); Martin v. Wilks, 490
U.S. 755 (1989) (permitting collateral attacks on prior consent decrees containing hiring and pro-
motion preferences, the overwhelming majority of which contain preferences for African Ameri-
cans); Wards Cove, 490 U.S. 642 (making burden of proof harder for plaintiffs in disparate impact
cases, which are an important vehicle for uncovering racial discrimination).
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decisions were generic procedural cutbacks, harming all Title VII plain-
tiffs. 222 One decision was a nominal victory for a plaintiff-an upper-
class white woman who had met the male standards of a prestigious
accounting firm yet still was denied employment opportunities.2
A different line of cases altogether also supports this theme. The
Court in the late 1980s created a clear statement rule presuming that
federal jurisdiction to enforce important national policies cannot be in-
voked when there is a private agreement to arbitrate-even though the
agreement is arguably a boilerplate term in a contract of adhesion.224
These decisions reflect a judicial willingness to abandon statutorily
mandated federal jurisdiction in cases in which there is certain to have
been unequal bargaining power, and hence a likelihood that private ar-
bitral remedies will sacrifice national policies created by Congress.
To the extent that the Court is systematically protecting vested
private interests from governmental intrusion, the Court is reflecting
Lochner-era baselines, in which governmental regulation was the excep-
tion rather than the rule. That sort of activism-classically represented
in Aramco-has been normatively passe since the New Deal. The
Court's apparent insensitivity to the interests of African Americans
seems normatively suspect after Brown v. Board of Education. While
the Rehnquist Court may have good reasons for trimming back the
Warren Court's activism in favor of racial minorities, it has advanced
no defense for regression to a regime in which the Court seems hostile
to minorities even while responding enthusiastically to more established
interests. That all this has taken place at the sub-constitutional
level-where the mysteries of and ennui about statutory interpretation
may shroud what is actually taking place-is cause for particular
concern.
2. Preference for State Sovereignty over National Regulation
A second theme of the Court's recent canonical jurisprudence is an
intense devotion to protecting state sovereignty interests. Unlike the
first theme, which emerges only after systematic scrutiny of the Court's
recent decisions, this theme is one the Court is openly pursuing. For
example, the theme is obvious from the Court's recent decisions pro-
222. See Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989) (interpreting
counsel fees provision conservatively); Lorance, 490 U.S. 900 (containing a stingy interpretation of
Title VII's statute of limitations).
223. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
224. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991) (involving an age
discrimination claim); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989) (involving a securities law claim); Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220 (1987) (also involving a securities law claim).
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tecting state sovereignty from federal regulatory interference-such as
Pennhurst's clear statement rule against conditions attached to federal
funding of state programs; Gregory's super-strong clear statement rule
against national regulation of core state governmental functions; Atas-
cadero's super-strong clear statement rule against federal abrogation of
state immunity from lawsuits; Davis' presumption that federal statutes
touching upon intergovernmental tax immunities follow Supreme Court
constitutional decisions affording states wide leeway in taxing federal
employees; Cotton Petroleum, which may signal the Court's willingness
to undermine traditional canons protecting Indian tribes against state
regulation; and recent decisions such as Coleman v. Thompson,
225
which presume against federal habeas relief and in favor of established
state procedures for adjudicating constitutional claims of convicted
criminals. Relatedly, the Court in United States v. Nordic Village,
Inc.226 has just extended the reasoning of these precedents protecting
state sovereignty to create a super-strong clear statement rule against
federal waivers of the United States' own sovereign immunity.
Unlike the first theme, the second theme seems more normatively
attractive. Its main articulation is in Gregory v. Ashcroft, in which Jus-
tice O'Connor's opinion for the Court rhapsodized about the values of
federalism:
It assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse
needs of a heterogeneous society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in
democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and experimentation in govern-
ment; and it makes government more responsive by putting the States in competi-
tion for a mobile citizenry .... Perhaps the principal benefit of the federalist
system is a check on abuses of government power .... 217
There is much to be said for this vision of federalism, and this value
might be applied soundly in Gregory, which we think is an easy case for
all the traditional reasons. But the value of federalism is not unambigu-
ous even to the Court, which in Chisom, decided the same day as Greg-
ory, ignored the value to apply the Voting Rights Act-a massive
intrusion into core state sovereign functions-to regulate the elections
of state judges.
Chisom suggests that however much our polity might value federal-
ism, it is a value we are prepared to sacrifice for at least some overrid-
ing national policies. In particular, the Court has not grappled with the
truly difficult issue of why federalism in particular (and sovereign im-
225. 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991) (holding that constitutional claims presented for the first time in
state habeas cannot be subject to review in federal habeas).
226. 112 S. Ct. 1011 (1992) (extending the Atascadero super-strong clear statement rule to
apply to waivers of United States sovereign immunity).
227. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2399-2400 (1991).
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munity generally) should not be sacrificed when individual rights and
public policies are at stake. The dissenting opinion in Coleman put it
well:
Federalism, however, has no inherent normative value: it does not. . . blindly pro-
tect the interests of the States from any incursion of the federal courts. Rather,
federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sover-
eign power. "Federalism is a device for realizing the concepts of decency and fair-
ness which are among the fundamental principles of liberty and justice lying at the
base of all our civil and political institutions.
'228
If, as both the Gregory majority and the Coleman dissent assert, feder-
alism ultimately subserves the preservation of individual liberties, there
seems scant reason not to sacrifice state sovereignty interests to individ-
ual rights in the name of, and not against, the norm of federalism. Fed-
eralism can mean that individual liberties are doubly protected-at
both the state level and through national super-regulation. This is a
reading of federalism that is more consistent with the supremacy clause
of the Constitution, and with the Constitution's evolution as a docu-
ment that protects individual rights and liberties. It is also a reading of
federalism the Court itself gave in Tafflin v. Levitt,2 9 which created a
clear statement rule (based upon the supremacy clause) presuming that
federal statutory schemes are enforceable in state as well as federal
courts.
3. Preference for Executive Rulemaking over Congressional
Lawmaking
Unlike the interpretive slant toward private ordering and state sov-
ereignty, the Court's canonical preference for executive rulemaking over
congressional lawmaking has been discussed widely in the scholarly
literature, at least in the context of Chevron and judicial deference to
agency interpretations.23 0 Accordingly, as is appropriate at the end of a
228. 111 S. Ct. at 2569-70 (Blackmun dissenting, quoting William J. Brennan, Jr., Federal
Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An Exercise in Federalism, 7 Utah L. Rev. 423, 432 (1961))
(objecting to the Court's cutting back further on habeas relief, based upon questionable and ritual-
istic invocation of "federalism").
229. 493 U.S. 455 (1990). See id. at 800-02 (Scalia concurring).
230. For discussions of Chevron and related developments, see, for example, Cynthia R. Fa-
rina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 Colum.
L. Rev. 452 (1989); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency
Decisionmaking: Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 481 (1990); Antonin
Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretation of Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511; Sidney A.
Shapiro and Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Quiet Revolution in
Administrative Law, 1988 Duke L.J. 819; Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year:
Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Ac-
tion, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1093 (1987); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90
Colum. L. Rev. 2071 (1990).
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long article, we may be brief.
From a normative perspective, this preference may be supportable
both as promoting judicial economy and as accommodating our consti-
tutional structure to the modern administrative state's need for flexibil-
ity.2 3 But Chevron and Japan Whaling are also grounded in another
normative value, deference of unelected judges to a democratically ac-
countable branch. As with the federalism canons, this value seems su-
perficially attractive. Yet, like homages to federalism, in this context
encomiums to executive accountability seem acontextual and hollow.
When the contest in a Chevron situation is expressed not as a choice
between the interpretation of the democratically accountable executive
branch and that of the unelected judiciary, but rather as a conflict be-
tween the democratically elected Congress that passed the statute in
some year past and an executive agency connected to the current
elected President, the invocation of democratic legitimacy for the
Court's preference for executive rulemaking becomes much more prob-
lematic. 23 2 The implications of recasting the conflict in this way are par-
ticularly troublesome in the current era of divided government, in
which one political party tends to control Congress and the other con-
trols the executive branch and federal judicial appointments. Even if
one does not subscribe wholeheartedly to the notion that the Court's
preference for executive rulemaking is unabashed partisanship-the
Republican judiciary supporting the Republican executive branch at
the expense of the Democratic Congress-both the appearance and
practical effect of the preference are normatively questionable.
CONCLUSION
In the early years of the Burger Court, quasi-constitutional law was
of interest to conservative constitutional scholars because it would give
Congress "a role in fixing the consequences" of constitutionally activist
judicial review in the promotion of individual rights.33 It is a measure
of how far public law has evolved since then that today constitutional
scholars of a quite different ideological perspective might entertain
quasi-constitutional law as preferable to typical Marbury-style judicial
review in the hands of today's Court. Thus, the current constitutional
centrist or liberal might view Gregory as preferable to National League
231. See generally Strauss, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1093 (cited in note 230).
232. See Stephen F. Ross, Reaganist Realism Comes to Detroit, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 399. For
a game-theoretic assessment of the strategic possibilities for the Supreme Court along these lines,
see William N. Eskridge, Jr. and John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 Geo. L. J. 523
(1992).
233. Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Com-
mon Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 45 (1975).
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of Cities, Chevron better than reviving the nondelegation doctrine, and
so forth.
In our view, at least one key question is whether this preference
amounts to anything more than purely comparative pragmatism. In
other words, for example, is Gregory supportable on its own terms, or is
the only nice thing that can be said about the decision that its conse-
quences are somewhat less drastic than imposing the same value judg-
ments through traditional judicial review and reviving National League
of Cities?
As we have explained, in the abstract there are powerful arguments
for quasi-constitutional law rooted in a vision of our public lawmaking
processes as a partnership in which the judiciary plays an active role,
but eventually defers to the democratically accountable branches. In
some contexts, these arguments may have substantial persuasive power.
We fear, however, that they have had little contextual bite in many of
the recent cases in which the Court has employed sub-constitutional
interpretive techniques. We also fear that a lack of recognition and can-
dor about what the Court has done recently with quasi-constitutional
law has submerged a variety of hotly contestable normative and empiri-
cal issues. Modesty may be a "species of nobility," as Spinoza once
wrote, 3 4 but judicial modesty cloaking judicial activism strikes us as
falling into another category altogether.
234. Benedict Spinoza, Ethics 126 (A. Boyle transl., E. P. Dutton, 1941) (orig. ed. 1670).
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